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INCENTIVIZED INFORMANTS, BRADY, RUIZ, AND
WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT: REQUIRING PRE-PLEA
DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE
Markus Surratt*
Abstract: An incentivized informant scandal recently hit Orange County, California
where county officials were caught lying, hiding, and not providing information about their
informants. Concerned citizens, attorneys, and scholars are beginning to ask more questions
as these stories receive increased nationwide attention: what should we do about false
incentivized informant testimony? What can we do?
Under Brady, Giglio, Ruiz, and their progeny, in criminal cases the government must turn
over any material exculpatory evidence that it possesses, or that is available, when the
defendant decides to go to trial. However, if the government does not know—or purports not
to know—about material exculpatory information, such as an informant’s testimonial history,
then there are often inadequate guidelines, rules, or incentives in place for the government to
seek out and turn over this type of information. Moreover, because about 95% of state and
federal cases end in plea deals, an informant’s credibility usually eludes public, judicial, and
the accused’s scrutiny.
This Comment offers solutions for legislatures, courts, and other government actors to
use to help reduce wrongful imprisonment caused by false incentivized informant testimony.
First, it outlines the types of information about incentivized informants that the government
should seek out. Second, it offers several solutions and, working within United States v.
Ruiz’s framework, this Comment suggests a legal standard for when the government must
provide material information about an informant before a plea deal: when the government’s
case primarily relies on informant testimony but material exculpatory evidence in its
possession shows actual innocence.

INTRODUCTION
Andrew Chambers is a professional snitch. For almost three decades,
Chambers has made a living working as an undercover informant for the
government by testifying in court on criminal prosecutions.1 Since 1984,
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. Thank you to Lara
Zarowsky, Director of the University of Washington’s Legislative Advocacy Clinic. My experience
in her clinic helped shape my topic. And thank you to the Washington Law Review team for their
editorial work on this Comment.
1. Dennis Wagner, DEA Reactivates Controversial Fired Informant, USA TODAY (June 5, 2013,
7:22 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/05/dea-reactivates-controversialinformant/2390989/ [https://perma.cc/P86H-MSPS]; see also Michael D. Sorkin & Phyllis Brasch
Librach, Top U.S. Drug Snitch is a Legend and a Liar, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH (Jan. 16, 2000),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/top-u-s-drug-snitch-is-a-legend-and-
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Chambers worked with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on over
280 cases.2 Chambers, with a rap sheet exceeding a dozen crimes,
reportedly made four million dollars during his first year as an
informant.3 However, Chambers’s career was seemingly cut short in
2000 after the Justice Department discovered that he committed perjury
in at least sixteen of his cases.4
But Chambers resurfaced again in the late 2000s as a DEA informant
in a drug case in Phoenix, Arizona.5 Federal authorities did not explain
why they decided to reinstate Chambers as an informant.6 Yet shortly
after the public learned of Chambers’s reappearance and involvement in
the Phoenix case, federal prosecutors dismissed the drug smuggling
charges against the defendants in the case.7 The U.S. Attorney’s Office
in Phoenix did not comment on their sudden decision to drop the
smuggling charges.8
Chambers’s story is an outlier, but by no means unique in the
incentivized informant world.9 His story is an extreme example of why
a/article_aecd2026-0306-5afc-85f6-7ffa066a5bb7.html [https://perma.cc/X8SQ-SEW3] (describing
Chambers’s long history of informing for the government).
2. Wagner, supra note 1.
3. Id. Adjusting for inflation in December of 1984, that amount is $9,415,650.52 in January
of 2018, as calculated from Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/data/
inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/39GC-SJPG] (follow “Inflation Calculator” hyperlink;
then input “4,000,000” in “December 1984” and buying power as in “January 2018”). Other sources
believe this is Chambers’s total career snitch earnings. See Sorkin & Brasch Librach, supra note 1.
4. Wagner, supra note 1; see also Andrew Murr, King of the Drugbusters, NEWSWEEK (July 2,
2000, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/king-drugbusters-161927 [https://perma.cc/8U42QUSP] (“Chambers said he had never been arrested, when in fact he had been—10 times between
1984 and 1998, according to government records . . . .”). Interestingly, Chambers said “ninety-five
percent of my cases was done accidentally, just being at the right place at the right time.” The
Speaker Agency, Andrew Chambers, The Accidental Narc, YOUTUBE (Dec. 23, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sGGMpsN_Zl4 [https://perma.cc/W736-YT85]. Chambers was
“at the right place at the right time” for over 200 cases. Id.; Wagner, supra note 1.
5. Wagner, supra note 1.
6. See id.; Nick Wing, The DEA Once Turned A 14-Year-Old into a Drug Kingpin. Welcome to
the War on Drugs, HUFFPOST (Oct. 24, 2014, 10:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
10/24/dea-war-on-drugs_n_6030920.html [https://perma.cc/S9EY-QYWP].
7. JJ Hensley & Dan Nowicki, Case Built on Informer Falls Apart, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (June 5,
2013),
http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/20130605case-built-informer-falls-apart.html
[https://perma.cc/DJ6Z-SUDK] (“[T]he move to dismiss the case has prompted at least one member
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over the DEA, to raise the issue of a
federal investigation into the decision to use Chambers in the first place.”).
8. Id.
9. But see Rich Lord, Court Files Reveal Million-Dollar Informants, PITT. POST-GAZ. (Apr. 26,
2014, 11:30 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2014/04/27/Telling-for-Dollars-Courtfiles-reveal-DEA-million-dollar-informants/stories/201404270144 [https://perma.cc/H4W9-4RXU].
Andrew Chambers Jr. was only one of several million-dollar informants. Another informant

Surratt (Ready to Pub)

2018]

3/18/2018 9:53 PM

INCENTIVIZED INFORMANTS

525

better rules should regulate using incentivized informants: juries, courts,
prosecutors, and defense counsel should be able to accurately assess an
informant’s credibility.
An incentivized witness is any witness who testifies on behalf of a
party for a tangible or expected benefit—from the government or
otherwise—in a trial proceeding.10 This Comment focuses on
incentivized witnesses who testify for the government in exchange for a
tangible or expected benefit, such as money or reduced criminal
punishment. These latter witnesses will be referred to from here on as
“incentivized informants.” This Comment does not focus on the Good
Samaritan or other individuals who only testify in court to reduce and
prevent crime in their communities.
There are three major issues with incentivized informant testimony.
First, some informants, whose statements go unchecked by government
actors, can game the system, remaining free from punishment while
duping law enforcement and prosecutors.11 Second, when these
incentives are not disclosed to all participants in a criminal proceeding,
the parties lack the information needed to make well-informed
assessments of an incentivized informant’s credibility.12 This holds
especially true for juries, but it is also important for prosecutors, law
enforcement, courts, and defense counsel. Lastly, unchecked
incentivized informant testimony can place innocent people in jail or
prison.13 There have been numerous cases where a person was wrongly
included the “Princess” who was an alleged DEA informant paid one million dollars over four years
for drug bust cases. Id.
10. See E.S.S.B. 5038, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (“‘Benefit’ means any deal, payment,
promise, leniency, inducement, or other advantage offered by the state to an informant in exchange
for his or her testimony, information, or statement, but excludes a court-issued protection order.”).
This Comment only focuses on criminal trials with government witnesses, which places exclusive
emphasis on witnesses testifying on behalf of the government against a defendant.
11. A poignant example of this behavior was Leslie Vernon White, a snitch who successfully lied
dozens of times to prosecutors and law enforcement. White was so good that he could even gather
enough information while in prison to manufacture a false confession from another inmate. See Ted
Rohrlich, Review of Murder Cases Is Ordered: Jail-House Informant Casts Doubt on Convictions
Based on Confessions, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-1029/news/mn-329_1_murder-case [https://perma.cc/Y793-YG2G].
12. See, e.g., Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996) (describing the dangers of using criminal informants at trial);
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3rd ed. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pinvestigate.html [https://perma
.cc/MTW5-HNRC] (assigning to prosecutor’s a duty to seek justice).
13. Indeed, Northwestern University School of Law’s 2003 study found that incentivized
informants were a leading cause of wrongful convictions in capital cases, involving 45.9% of those
cases. NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW
SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3
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convicted and later exonerated after discovering that an incentivized
informant’s testimony was false.14
Brady v. Maryland15 in 1963, and Brady’s progeny, make clear that
defendants and the accused16 have a right to access evidence held by or
available to the government when that evidence is material to guilt or
innocence for an upcoming trial.17 Concerning incentivized informants,
this includes any material impeachment evidence.18 Impeachment
evidence is information that challenges a witness’s credibility.19
To solve the problem of wrongful imprisonment caused by false
testimony by incentivized informants, one must identify and define
whom these informants are, what incentives play a role in their
testimony, and the kind of information that affects their credibility.
This Comment begins by explaining Brady’s evolution since 1963,
common portraits of incentivized informants, and some of the history of
incentivized informants in America. Then this Comment offers several
solutions to reduce wrongful imprisonment attributable to incentivized
informant testimony. Part I gives an overview of how Brady’s
requirements—including those emphasized in United States v. Ruiz20—
affect informant testimony and disclosures. It also summarizes the split
among circuit courts about pre-plea disclosure of material exculpatory
evidence. Part II briefly describes some of America’s history of using
incentivized informants. Part III proposes solutions that government
(2004) [hereinafter THE SNITCH SYSTEM], https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/02/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AMT-6DJY].
14. See, e.g., State v. Gassman, 175 Wash. 2d 208, 208, 283 P.3d 1113, 1113 (2012); State v.
Statler, 160 Wash. App. 622, 622, 248 P.3d 165, 165 (2011); State v. Gassman, 160 Wash. App.
600, 600, 248 P.3d 155, 155 (2011); State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577, 577, 249 P.3d 669, 669
(2011). All three men in the above cases were convicted by false informant testimony and later
exonerated.
15. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
16. This Comment refers to both defendants and the accused when discussing individuals affected
by incentivized informants. When there is the need to distinguish between the two, this Comment
does so. For purposes of this Comment, “defendant” means a person charged with a crime and
awaiting a trial or further criminal proceeding(s). The “accused” means someone who is accused of
a crime, regardless of whether this person is formally charged or incarcerated for an alleged crime.
These terms may also refer to the status of convicted individuals before their charges, conviction,
and incarceration.
17. Id. at 87.
18. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972).
19. United States v. Harris, 557 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir. 2009) (“But impeachment of a witness
involves evidence that calls into question the witness’s veracity. It deals with ‘matters like the bias
or interest of a witness, his or her capacity to observe an event in issue, or a prior statement of the
witness inconsistent with his or her current testimony.’” (citations omitted)).
20. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
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actors, particularly prosecutors, law enforcement, legislatures, and courts
can use to reduce wrongful imprisonment caused by using incentivized
informants. Finally, Part IV suggests a pre-plea deal legal standard for
requiring informant disclosure.
I.

BACKGROUND ON BRADY’S CONTOURS AND MATERIAL
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

This Part first offers an overview of how Brady has developed since
1963. This includes a summary of United States v. Ruiz and the split
among the U.S. Courts of Appeals. It then describes the general types of
informants in the American criminal justice system.
A.

Incentivized Informant Testimony is Loosely Regulated Under
Brady, Giglio, and Ruiz

This section is broken into several sub-sections. The first discusses
the constitutional foundation of a defendant’s right to material
exculpatory evidence. The second examines two types of material
exculpatory evidence: witness credibility and impeachment evidence.
The third covers the government’s investigative duties regarding
material exculpatory evidence and situations when this evidence should
be suppressed. The final sub-section summarizes recent applications of
Brady and its progeny.
1.

Napue and Brady: Criminal Defendants Have a Right to Evidence
Showing Their Innocence

Since Napue v. Illinois21 and Brady v. Maryland,22 government
prosecutors have been required to give materially exculpatory evidence
in their possession to a criminal defendant: “suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates

21. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Napue involved four men who murdered an off-duty police officer
during a robbery of a cocktail lounge in Chicago. Id. at 265. One of the robbers, Hamer, was caught,
convicted, and sentenced to 199 years in prison. Id. Hamer, an accomplice in the murder, testified
against his fellow accomplice, Napue. Id. at 265–66. During his testimony, Hamer said that the
prosecution did not promise to consider his testimony when sentencing Hamer, a lie that the
prosecutor did not correct during the trial. Id. at 267. The Court found that this violated Napue’s due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 270–72.
22. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that defendant, who was convicted of murder, and whose
potential accomplice testified against him at trial, deserved a new trial because the government
failed to turn over evidence that this potential accomplice admitted to the murder while talking to
law enforcement before trial).
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due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”23 This right is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.24
Brady involved a defendant who was convicted of murder.25 An
alleged accomplice, Boblit, confessed to the murder in a government
interview.26 However, the prosecution withheld Boblit’s confession from
Brady until Brady was convicted of murder and sentenced.27 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that any prosecutorial suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused violates due process when that evidence is
material to guilt or punishment.28
2.

Material Exculpatory Evidence Includes a Witness’s Promise or
Agreement with the Government

Nine years after Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court in Giglio v. United
States29 clarified that witnesses’ credibility, including their
understanding or agreement as to their own future prosecution, is a type
of exculpatory evidence that is favorable to a defendant.30 Such
exculpatory impeachment evidence31 under Brady may be material
depending on the strength of other evidence in the case.32 The accused
need not have requested this information, or any other exculpatory
information, for a Brady violation to occur.33

23. Id. at 87.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
25. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84–86.
26. Id. at 84.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 87.
29. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
30. Id. at 154–55.
31. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (“[T]he Court disavowed any difference between
exculpatory and impeachment evidence for Brady purposes.” (citing United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 683 (1985))).
32. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154–55; see also Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009) (“The right to a
fair trial, guaranteed to state criminal defendants by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, imposes on States certain duties consistent with their sovereign obligation to ensure
‘that “justice shall be done”’ in all criminal prosecutions.” (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 111 (1976))).
33. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (“We have since held that the duty to disclose such
evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused . . . .” (citing Agurs,
427 U.S. at 107)).
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When deciding how to define “material,” the U.S. Supreme Court in
United States v. Bagley34—a case where the government promised not to
prosecute two informants in exchange for their testimony—gave this
definition: “[t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”35 The Court also noted that exculpatory and impeachment
evidence, both falling under Brady, are not constitutionally different
from one another regarding the government’s failure to disclose
information.36
3.

Suppressing Material Exculpatory Evidence Requires Examining
All Evidence, Including Evidence Known to Government Actors
Involved in the Case

In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court further shaped Brady’s contours in
Kyles v. Whitley.37 In Kyles, the Court held that the total impact of all
evidence favorable to the defendant must be considered, rather than only
examining each piece of evidence separately.38 The Kyles Court stated
that the prosecution’s knowledge of evidence favorable to the defendant,
and unknown to the defense, is not automatically a Brady violation.39
The prosecution has the “consequent responsibility” to assess this
cumulative impact and to know when there is a reasonable probability of
a Brady violation.40 As a result, the Court assigned to prosecutors a
“duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on
the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”41 Consistent
with Brady, this “duty to learn” holds irrespective of the prosecution’s
good faith or bad faith.42
34. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
35. Id. at 682.
36. Id. at 676–77; see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
37. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
38. Id. at 420.
39. Id. at 436–37.
40. Id. at 437.
41. Id. And this duty presumably extends to learn about favorable evidence concerning
incentivized informants. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case No. 99-3096 (Brady Obligations), 185 F.3d
887, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting “[t]he government concedes that it never conducted a full-fledged
Brady search with respect to any agreements its various components may have had with [the
adverse witness for defense,] Jones,” and that “[f]or the reasons stated above, that failure constituted
a breach of the government’s ‘duty to search’ for Brady information” (citations omitted)).
42. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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Additionally, the Court in Kyles held that prosecutors must turn over
information that an informant made inconsistent statements when this
information is material.43 Materiality hinges on whether there is a
“reasonable probability” that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the proceeding’s outcome would have been different.44
Evidence that is merely helpful to the defense is not enough.45 However,
the defense does not need to show that the government’s disclosure of
material exculpatory evidence would have resulted in the defendant’s
acquittal.46
To be a “true Brady violation,” the evidence at issue must favor the
accused by being exculpatory or impeaching, be suppressed by the
government willfully or inadvertently, and prejudice the accused.47
Prejudice depends on whether there is a reasonable probability that the
trial’s result would have been different if the suppressed information was
given to the defense.48
4.

Perceived Limits and Applications of Brady Since the Millennium

The new millennium began with further constrictions to the general
Brady rule: the government seemingly only has to produce exculpatory
impeachment material if the defendant decides to go to trial, but not
during plea negotiations and the entry of a guilty plea.49 In Ruiz, decided
in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court, when considering the availability of
informant impeachment information, stated that “[t]he Constitution does
not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence
prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.”50 The
43. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 453 (“[T]he question is . . . whether we can be confident that the jury’s
verdict would have been the same.”).
44. Id. at 440–41.
45. Id. at 436–37.
46. Id. at 434.
47. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999) (holding that defendant’s Brady violation
claim was not satisfied because defendant failed to meet the “reasonable probability” required of the
prejudice element). Compare id. at 293 (“[Witness] Stoltzfus’ vivid description of the events at the
mall was not the only evidence that the jury had before it.”), with Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,
700–01 (2004) (“Regarding ‘prejudice,’ the contrast between Strickler and Banks’s case is
marked . . . . [Witness] Farr’s testimony was the centerpiece of Banks’s prosecution’s penalty-phase
case.” (emphasis added)).
48. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.
49. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002).
50. Id. at 623. This constriction on Brady is particularly troubling given that 90 to 95% of all
defendants plead guilty. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 78 (2009); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default
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Court reasoned that defendants who enter a guilty plea voluntarily waive
their Brady rights knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences, and satisfy
constitutional requirements.51
And four years later in 2006 in Youngblood v. West Virginia,52 the
U.S. Supreme Court continued emphasizing Brady’s progeny: “Brady
suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over evidence that
is ‘known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.’”53 In
Youngblood, the defendant was accused and convicted of sexual assault,
but appealed his conviction after evidence surfaced that an investigating
state trooper found and failed to produce a written note supporting
Youngblood’s consensual-sex defense.54 The Court found that
Youngblood presented a viable Brady violation claim because of the
state trooper’s failure to disclose the written note, and remanded the case
for further consideration.55 Six years after Youngblood, the Court
reaffirmed that, to prevail on a Brady claim, defendants need not show
that they would have “more likely than not” been acquitted had the new
evidence been admitted.56 Instead, only a reasonable probability that the
trial’s outcome could be different is needed.57
Lastly, in Wearry v. Cain,58 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
Louisiana’s failure to disclose information about a key informantwitness gave rise to a viable Brady claim.59 The Court held that
“[b]eyond doubt, the newly revealed evidence suffices to undermine
confidence in Wearry’s conviction. The State’s trial evidence resembles
a house of cards, built on the jury crediting [prisoner-informant] Scott’s
account rather than Wearry’s alibi.”60 The government failed to disclose
/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2010/Stats_Nat_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SMR-3ZLL] (as of 2010, the total percentage of federal cases ending in guilty
pleas was 96.8% versus 3.2% going to trial, out of 83,941 cases).
51. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623.
52. 547 U.S. 867 (2006).
53. Id. at 869–70 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995)).
54. Id. at 868.
55. Id. at 870.
56. Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (holding that evidence of inconsistent statements—
witness telling police that he could not identity defendant as perpetrator but then identifying
defendant at trial as the perpetrator—impeaching sole eyewitness testifying against the defendant,
who was convicted of murder, was grounds for a valid Brady violation claim when not disclosed).
57. Id. at 75–76 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440–41).
58. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016).
59. Id. at 1006.
60. Id.
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that the already-imprisoned informant Scott unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain a deal with prosecutors before testifying, may have had a personal
vendetta against the defendant, and coached another inmate to lie about
the defendant’s involvement in a murder.61 The jury had convicted
Wearry of capital murder based in large part on incentivized informant
testimony.62
From Napue and Brady to Ruiz and Wearry, the U.S. Supreme Court
has placed a firm obligation on the government to safeguard a
defendant’s constitutional rights.63 This requires the government to turn
over material exculpatory impeachment evidence bearing on an
informant’s credibility.64 Such impeachment evidence includes: prior
inconsistent statements or false statements made by a witness or
informant,65 any material exculpatory evidence favorable to the
defendant that is known by others acting on the government’s behalf,66
the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony,67 charges the
witness or informant is facing—if the charges are associated with a deal
or bargain with the government,68 benefits the government promises to
the witness or informant,69 and prior criminal convictions.70 But again,

61. Id. at 1006–07.
62. Id. at 1003–04.
63. See id. at 1006 (“But Louisiana instead charged Wearry with capital murder, and the only
evidence directly tying him to that crime was [prisoner] Scott’s dubious testimony, corroborated by
the similarly suspect testimony of [prisoner] Brown.”); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88
(1963) (“A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available,
would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the
defendant.”); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness
and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon
such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life
or liberty may depend.”).
64. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility
falls within this general [Brady] rule.” (citations omitted)).
65. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 453–54 (1995); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153.
66. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
67. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
68. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676–77 (1985). Prosecutors may also be required to
disclose their witness’s application for sentence commutation. See, e.g., Reutter v. Solem, 888 F.2d
578, 581 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Here, the prosecution failed to inform the defense that the state’s key
witness, Trygstad, had applied for sentence commutation and that when he gave his testimony at
petitioner’s trial he already had been scheduled to appear before the parole board a few days later.”).
69. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 684.
70. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112–13 (holding that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the victimwitness’s criminal record, though relevant under Brady, nonetheless did not require disclosure
because it was not material to the case); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(a)(vi) (2007) (“[T]he

Surratt (Ready to Pub)

2018]

3/18/2018 9:53 PM

INCENTIVIZED INFORMANTS

533

this evidence need only be disclosed if it is material, even for a
prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony.71 Furthermore, there are
even fewer informant disclosure requirements if the case is not yet set
for trial.72
B.

Ruiz and Plea Deals: The Ruiz Court’s Analysis Leaves Open
Required Pre-Plea Deal Informant Disclosures for Exculpatory
Evidence

In Ruiz, the defendant, Angela Ruiz, refused to accept the
government’s “fast track” plea bargain for illegally smuggling drugs. 73
Ruiz travelled from Mexico to the United States.74 Immigration agents in
the United States found thirty kilograms—about sixty-five pounds—of
marijuana in Ruiz’s luggage.75 Ruiz refused to accept the plea bargain
that federal prosecutors offered her because they required her to waive
her right to impeachment evidence about informants or other
witnesses.76 Because Ruiz would not agree to this waiver, the
government withdrew its offer.77
Even without this agreement, Ruiz eventually pled guilty.78 The court,
on the government’s recommendation, sentenced Ruiz to a harsher
sentence than recommended for the plea deal sentence.79 Ruiz appealed
her sentence.80 On appeal, she argued that she was entitled to this
impeachment evidence before negotiating or accepting a plea.81
The Ruiz Court ruled against her, saying that “the Constitution does
not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence
prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.”82 But the
prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant . . . any record of prior criminal convictions
known to the prosecuting attorney.”).
71. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678–80 (“[T]he knowing use of perjured testimony . . . is considered
material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
72. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002).
73. Id. at 625.
74. United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
75. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 622.
78. Id. at 626.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. Ruiz’s appeal was under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, Review of a Sentence, which states in part
that a “defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final
sentence if the sentence . . . was imposed in violation of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) (2012).
82. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623.
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Court’s conclusion depended on whether Ruiz voluntarily, knowingly,
intelligently, and with sufficient awareness waived her constitutional
rights.83 It also depended on the difficulty in determining when this
information is helpful to the accused and disrupting and severely
burdening the government’s investigation.84
Therefore, the Ruiz Court first held that impeachment information is
special in relation to the fairness of trial and not with respect to plea
deals if a plea is voluntary.85 The Court continued: “the law ordinarily
considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would
likely apply in general in the circumstances—even though the defendant
may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.”86
Second, the Court stated that it is difficult to characterize
impeachment information as critical information that the accused must
know before a plea deal because it is unknown if the information will or
will not help the accused.87 The degree of help, the Court went on,
depends on the accused’s independent knowledge of the prosecutor’s
potential case.88
Third, the Ruiz Court stated that the Constitution, with respect to the
defendant’s awareness of the relevant circumstances, does not require
complete knowledge.89 “It is difficult to distinguish, in terms of
importance, (1) a defendant’s ignorance of grounds for impeachment of
potential witnesses at a possible future trial from (2) the varying forms
of ignorance at issue in these cases.”90
Fourth, the Court said that due process considerations, which include
the nature of the private interests at stake, the value of the additional
safeguard, and the adverse impact of the requirement on the
government’s interests, argue against a right to information in Ruiz’s
case.91
The Court stated that the added value of this safeguard was minimal
because the value depends on the accused’s independent knowledge of

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 633.
Id. at 630–32.
Id. at 629.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631.
Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)).

Surratt (Ready to Pub)

2018]

3/18/2018 9:53 PM

INCENTIVIZED INFORMANTS

535

the government’s case.92 It also reasoned that “the Government will
provide ‘any information establishing the factual innocence of the
defendant regardless.’”93 And other additional safeguards, the Court
said, such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, would protect the
defendant’s constitutional rights.94 The Court then said that the
government’s interest in the efficient administration of justice,
protecting witnesses, and not disrupting ongoing investigations weighed
against a constitutional obligation to provide impeachment information
before plea negotiations.95
The Ruiz Court ruled that pre-plea impeachment evidence need not be
disclosed. But there remains a split within the U.S. Courts of Appeals as
to whether the government must turn over material exculpatory evidence
before a guilty plea. The first section summarizes the Seventh Circuit’s
position requiring such disclosure. The second section summarizes the
Fifth Circuit’s opposing position.
1.

The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis Supports Pre-Plea Informant
Disclosures that Align with Ruiz and Constitutional Due Process

The Seventh Circuit, in 2003 in McCann v. Mangialardi96 addressed,
in dicta, pre-plea informant disclosures in Ruiz and concluded the
following: “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz strongly suggests
that a Brady-type disclosure might be required under the circumstances
of this particular case.”97
Mangialardi involved a deputy chief police officer—Sam
Mangialardi—participating in cocaine trafficking.98 One of
Mangialardi’s traffickers suspected a person, former defendant and now
plaintiff, Demetrius McCann, of being an informant.99 This trafficker
planted drugs in McCann’s car.100 Mangialardi then ordered police to
92. Id.
93. Id. The Court omitted the citation for their quotation.
94. Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court
must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” (emphasis added)); McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (holding that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the
judge must personally address the defendant and determine whether the defendant’s plea was
voluntarily made with sufficient understanding).
95. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631–32.
96. 337 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2003).
97. Id. at 787.
98. Id. at 783.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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search McCann’s car, where they found the drugs and arrested
McCann.101 McCann later pled guilty to drug charges.102
Regarding the importance of an informant’s testimony in the
government’s case, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Thus, Ruiz indicates a significant distinction between
impeachment information and exculpatory evidence of actual
innocence. Given this distinction, it is highly likely that the
Supreme Court would find a violation of the Due Process Clause
if prosecutors or other relevant government actors have
knowledge of a criminal defendant’s factual innocence but fail
to disclose such information to a defendant before he enters into
a guilty plea.103
The Mangialardi Court did not consider the pre-plea disclosure
issue.104 This was because former defendant McCann failed to show that
police deputy Mangialardi knew about the McCann’s factual innocence
before McCann pled guilty.105
Once more, in 2016 in Cairel v. Alderden,106 the Seventh Circuit
reemphasized, again in dicta, potential pre-plea disclosure requirements:
the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, even in the context of plea
deals, may be an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty violating
Brady.107
However, since the former defendant in Cairel had access to the
exculpatory information before pleading guilty, the Seventh Circuit did
not consider pre-plea disclosures under Ruiz.108 There were two
defendants in Cairel, one of whom, Jeremy Cairel, appeared to have a
learning disability.109 After initially denying involvement, Cariel
admitted to the robbery, and implicated his co-defendant, Marvin
Johnson.110 Both men were eventually found innocent and released when

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id.
Id.
821 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 833.
Id. at 833 n.3.
Id. at 828–29.
Id. at 828.
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detectives found information supporting their innocence.111 Johnson said
he pled guilty, despite his innocence, to avoid jail time.112
2.

The Fifth Circuit’s Reasoning Restricts Ruiz and Declines to
Distinguish Between Impeachment Evidence and Exculpatory
Evidence

The Seventh Circuit’s analysis contrasts with the Fifth Circuit’s.113 In
2009, in United States v. Conroy,114 the Fifth Circuit rejected the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis, namely that the Ruiz Court’s limited
discussion to impeachment evidence suggests that exculpatory evidence
should be treated differently.115 The Fifth Circuit in Conroy ruled that
“Ruiz never ma[de] such a distinction nor can this proposition be implied
from its discussion.”116
Then in 2017 in Alvarez v. City of Brownsville,117 a three judge panel
on the Fifth Circuit affirmed Conroy.118 In Alvarez, the defendant was
arrested for burglary and intoxication.119 At the jail, the detention officer
accused the defendant Alvarez of assault.120 Alvarez pled guilty.121
Several years later, video evidence surfaced showing Alvarez’s
innocence.122 The panel of judges in Alvarez denied Alvarez’s Brady
claim for damages: Alvarez did not have a constitutional right to this
exculpatory evidence when he pleaded guilty.123 Additionally, the panel
distinguished Alvarez as a case involving a Brady claim for civil
damages, rather than a collateral attack on a guilty plea.124

111. Id. at 830.
112. Id.
113. See generally United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
114. 567 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
115. Id. at 179.
116. Id.
117. 860 F.3d 799 (5th Cir. 2017).
118. Id. at 802–03.
119. Id. at 800.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 803.
124. Id. Indeed, Alvarez’s conviction was overturned after the exculpatory video evidence
surfaced. Id.
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A few months later, in November 2017, the Fifth Circuit granted
rehearing en banc.125 Their en banc decision is pending as of this
Comment’s writing.
The reasoning and analysis above lays the foundation for supporting a
legal standard that sometimes requires the government to turn over
exculpatory information relating to informants before plea negotiations.
However, first, it is necessary to know whom these informants are, and
what motives they have to lie.
C.

Brady Only Requires the Government Turn Over Limited
Information About Incentivized Informants to the Accused

There are several general types of incentivized informants in the
American criminal justice system, each of which interacts differently
with Brady’s progeny. These incentivized informants can loosely be
categorized as: the jailhouse snitch, the professional snitch, the
accomplice, the calumniator—one who falsely accuses others—and the
confidential informant.
1.

The Jailhouse Snitch

The jailhouse snitch126 is the prototypical incentivized informant.127
Jailhouse snitches are in jail or prison. But, if they help law enforcement
and prosecutors with a case, then they may receive a reduced sentence,
money on the books, a better cell, cigarettes, clothes, or other services or
privileges.128 And, if they are lucky, then they may even be released.129
The jailhouse snitch is the most commonly recognized snitch, whose
credibility is often at issue in many wrongful imprisonment cases
involving incentivized informants.130 Jailhouse snitches will typically
125. Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 874 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
126. Jack Call, Legal Notes, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 73, 73 (2001) (“A jailhouse informant is an inmate
who is either asked by the government to report any incriminating evidence shared with the inmate
by another inmate or who comes forward on his or her own with such information. The government
then agrees to give the informant some benefit in return for testifying against the targeted
defendant.”).
127. Once again, Leslie Vernon White in the 1980s stands out as an extreme example of a
jailhouse snitch. He would call local police and prosecutors’ departments impersonating a state
actor to gather information about a case and then use that information to create a false confession of
a new incarcerated person awaiting trial. See Ted Rohrlich, Jail Informant Owns Up to Perjury in a
Dozen Cases, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-01-04/news/mn-300_1_
murder-case [https://perma.cc/9NJQ-RT7A]; Rohrlich, supra note 11.
128. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 28.
129. Id. at 38.
130. Id.
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“overhear” detailed confessions or conversations from the accused, or
claim the accused confessed to them while both were incarcerated.131
Additionally, jailers and law enforcement sometimes recruit wellknown and helpful jailhouse snitches.132 Jailers may actively place
jailhouse snitches in the same cell as, or adjacent to, a recently
incarcerated individual who has not yet been convicted, or even
charged.133 The snitch then claims to get guilt-probative information
about the new prisoner, and provides this information to the jailers, law
enforcement, or prosecutors.134
Because of the usefulness of these statements, it is difficult for law
enforcement and prosecutors to stop using this information altogether.135
But it is important to learn more about jailhouse snitches. This includes
learning about their criminal and testimonial history and their reasons
and benefits for testifying. Such information would, if shared with
prosecutors, the court, the defense, and jurors, give our adversarial
system more rigor. It would also cause prosecutors to strongly

131. See C. Blaine Elliott, Life’s Uncertainties: How to Deal with Cooperating Witnesses and
Jailhouse Snitches, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 1, 1 (2003) (discussing a case where a jailhouse informant
testified against a defendant and later recanted and admitted to lying after the defendant was
executed); Kevin D. Williamson, When District Attorneys Attack, NAT’L REV. (May 31, 2015, 4:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419110/criminal-justice-mess-orange-county-kevin-dwilliamson [https://perma.cc/YR5Z-Y5WN] (“The database tracking inmates’ movements around
the jail and the reason for those movements is significant, because Orange County law enforcement
and prosecutors were in the habit of placing targeted suspects in proximity to criminal
informants . . . .”).
132. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: INVESTIGATION OF
THE INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS
ANGELES COUNTY 37, 52–53 (1990) [hereinafter L.A. GRAND JURY REPORT], http://grandjury.co
.la.ca.us/pdf/Jailhouse%20Informant.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS23-CHET] (describing how some
high-profile suspects are placed in classified groups of jailhouse informants). Afterwards, the L.A.
County District Attorney’s Office severely restricted the use of jailhouse informant testimony.
Jailhouse testimony now requires “strong corroboration,” payments over $50 are prohibited,
prosecutors must check an informant index, and prosecutors must obtain permission from a
committee to use the informant. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 189–90.
133. L.A. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 132, at 37. For a current look at the L.A. County
District Attorney’s Office policies on Brady, see L.A. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, POLICIES,
http://da.lacounty.gov/about/policies [https://perma.cc/DX4S-XYWP].
134. Call, supra note 126, at 83 (“Because jailhouse informants are already incarcerated, they are
likely to feel that they have nothing to lose and much to gain by providing information to the
government.”).
135. For example, Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in potentially reducing a
defendant-informant’s sentence, while trying to prevent lying, reads in part: “information the
usefulness of which could not reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant until more than
one year after sentencing . . . .” FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(2)(C).
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reexamine the reliability of a jailhouse informant.136 Under Brady, this
information must be turned over if it is material, but sometimes even
material information does not reach the jury.137 Often times this is
because defendants strike a plea deal.138
2.

The Professional Snitch

The professional snitch makes a career out of selling information.139
And the government is often the buyer. As mentioned in the
introduction, Andrews Chambers Jr. is an extreme example of a
professional snitch.140 Chambers was a repeat player in the incentivized
informant system.141 He gained the trust of his government handlers and
profited immensely for his efforts.142 In sum, the professional snitch, like
Chambers, has a constant presence in the incentivized informant system,
and gains rewards for giving the government information about crimes

136. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions,
57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 656 (2007) (“Failure to disclose exculpatory information at trial
means jurors will render a decision without that information and thus be more likely to render an
inaccurate verdict. But there is no jury at a guilty plea hearing.”).
137. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83–85 (1963). A great problem arises when, unlike in
Brady, there is a failure to appeal, or a plea deal. Then this information never reaches the jury or the
court. Regarding the plea deal, see NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 78 (discussing briefly the
psychology of why innocent people may agree to a plea deal).
138. Allana Durkin Richer & Curt Anderson, Trial or Deal? Some Driven to Plead Guilty, Later
Exonerated, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15, 2016), https://apnews.com/24cfa961d3444be49901496
fdcaa3fda [https://perma.cc/9V6L-PKKH] (“Last year, more than 97 percent of criminal defendants
sentenced in federal court pleaded guilty compared with about 85 percent more than 30 years ago,
according to data collected by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The increase in guilty
pleas has been a gradual rise over the last three decades.”).
139. See Joe Davidson, Want to Make a Million? Become a DEA Informant, WASH. POST
(Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/30/want-to-makea-million-become-a-dea-informant/?utm_term=.07e9630eacf1
[https://perma.cc/K8BZ-YYYB];
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION’S MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF ITS CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PROGRAM iv
(2016) [hereinafter AUDIT OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PROGRAM], https://oig.justice.gov/reports/
2016/a1633.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/AT5A-HL9F] (“Additionally, we identified one source
who was paid over $30 million during a 30-year period, some of it in cash payments of more than
$400,000.”).
140. Sorkin & Brasch Librach, supra note 2.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (stating that requests by
third parties of informant records need not be disclosed unless the informant’s status as an informant
has been officially confirmed); Bennett v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 55 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 1999)
(involving FOIA request to the DEA for records pertaining to the informant Andrew Chambers).
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and criminals.143 Snitches like Chambers are rewarded even if their
information turns out to be false.144
Under Brady’s progeny, an informant’s paid status is material for
Brady purposes and must be disclosed.145 Yet Chambers is an example
of what may happen despite Brady’s protections; the government gathers
enough information from a professional snitch to convict a defendant
only to find out later that this information was false.146 This type of
snitch provokes the oft-asked question: how many of these informants
provide testimony that no one discovers is fabricated?147
3.

The Accomplice

The accomplice informant is a person who is the alleged accomplice
of the defendant or the accused.148 Generally, the accomplice is someone
who allegedly worked in concert with others to commit a crime.149 The
accomplice takes loosely two forms.150 First, the accomplice could in
fact be an accomplice, but inform on individuals who had nothing to do
with the crime.151 Second, these accomplices may have been involved in
143. Lord, supra note 9.
144. See, e.g., AUDIT OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PROGRAM, supra note 139, at i (“In one case,
the DEA reactivated a confidential source who previously provided false testimony in trials and
depositions. During the approximate 5-year period of reactivation, this source was used by 13 DEA
field offices and paid $469,158. More than $61,000 of the $469,158 was paid after this source was
once again deactivated for making false statements to a prosecutor.”).
145. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). Banks involved a paid informant who told police
that the defendant was involved in a murder and knew where the murder weapon was, and the court
reversed the defendant’s conviction because the prosecution violated Brady by not turning over
information that the informant was being paid by the government. Id. at 668, 691.
146. Hensley & Nowicki, supra note 7.
147. Davidson, supra note 139 (“The report by the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector
General (IG) found serious deficiencies with the DEA’s confidential-source program, including
poor oversight that ‘exposes the DEA to an unacceptably increased potential for waste, fraud, and
abuse,’ IG Michael Horowitz said.”).
148. Two classic examples of the accomplice informant are Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
149. See R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the
Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (2004) (describing an accomplice
as a “joint venturer in a crime”).
150. While a person could theoretically pose as an accomplice when she was not involved in the
crime at all, to lie and minimize others’ liability, she would subject herself to liability. So, this
Comment disregards this option since no information could be found about how prevalent these
informants are. But see People v. Gray, 408 N.E.2d 1150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (convicting innocent
woman of murder who lied in her testimony about several others’ involvement in the murder hoping
for a reduced sentence).
151. See, e.g., State v. Statler, 160 Wash. App. 622, 629–30, 248 P.3d 165, 169 (2011) (finding
three later-exonerated men guilty based on informant testimony); State v. Gassman, 160 Wash. App.
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the crime, but, for reasons of self-interest, inform on their fellow
accomplices. These accomplices may also downplay their role in the
crime while exaggerating the role of other participants.152
The accomplice is a common type of informant used regularly by law
enforcement and prosecutors.153 In a prisoners’ dilemma, these
informants want to be as useful as possible to get the best deal for
themselves.154 So, their incentives to provide good testimony—and lie
while doing it—are strong.155 Thus, an accomplice’s background and
reliability are important in assessing that accomplice’s testimony.156
Brady covers an accomplice’s actual or expected benefits from the
government, but this information does not always come to light.157 Nor
does it cover accomplices’ self-preservation interests.158
4.

The Calumniator

The calumniator passes blame to someone else. The calumniator is
typically an informant who feigns innocence or downplays their
involvement in a crime.159 The target of this blame could be a co-

600, 606–08, 248 P.3d 155, 157–58 (2011) (same); State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577, 583–85,
249 P.3d 669, 672–73 (2011) (same).
152. See, e.g., Napue, 360 U.S. at 264 (involving a murder suspect accomplice who downplayed
his role by stating that he was a reluctant participant in the robbery that led to the victim’s murder).
153. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1528–29 (2008) (stating that
accomplices often become a key witness against their other accomplices).
154. For example, when the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 went into effect, it changed the
incentives for defendants in federal prosecutions. Parole was eliminated and mandatory minimums
were put in place. ETHAN BROWN, SNITCH: INFORMANTS, COOPERATORS & THE CORRUPTION OF
JUSTICE 43 (2007) (“Cooperation thus became a necessity for many defendants looking to reduce
their sentences.”); see also Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987,
1989–90.
155. Indeed, an informant can reduce his or her sentence in a federal proceeding by providing the
federal government with “substantial assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012).
156. See Sam Roberts, Should Prosecutors Be Required to Record Their Pretrial Interviews with
Accomplices and Snitches?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 285 n.222 (2005) (“[N]otoriously unreliable
witnesses include identification witnesses, young children, and cooperating witnesses such as
informants, accomplices, and so-called ‘snitches.’” (quoting Bennett L. Gershman,
The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 343 (2001))).
157. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding that nondisclosure and
noncommunication of prosecutor’s promise to witness that he would not be prosecuted if he
cooperated with the government—even though a different prosecutor who did not know about this
promise tried the case—was a Brady violation).
158. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 267 (1959).
159. Trott, supra note 12, at 1383 (stating that a criminal’s willingness to get out trouble includes
“lying, committing perjury, manufacturing evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their lies with
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conspirator, a rival gang member, or an innocent person who was at the
wrong place at the wrong time.160 The calumniator overlaps with some
of the other informants defined in this section, but is distinguished by the
desire to shift as much blame as possible onto another party, regardless
of who that other party is.161 This informant is either responsible for the
crime in question, or knows who is responsible, but decides to blame
another person or persons who did not commit the crime.162 These
informants are incentivized to blame others for the crime to reduce
liability for themselves or for another person.163
Unsurprisingly, this type of informant has been responsible for many
wrongful convictions in America.164 Calumniators are one of the more
difficult informants to deal with because their incentive, escaping
liability, is not as discoverable a benefit as promises or expectations
from the government.165 As such, under Brady, some useful information,

more lies, and double-crossing anyone with whom they come into contact including—and
especially—the prosecutor”).
160. See, e.g., State v. Statler, 160 Wash. App. 622, 630, 248 P.3d 165, 169 (2011). Statler was
one of three men convicted for an armed robbery. All three were later exonerated after their counsel
discovered that the informant’s testimony was not credible. The informant confessed to being
involved in the crime in the case.
161. Id. at 628–29. The informant in the case, Dunham, received a seventeen-month juvenile
sentence. In exchange, the three men wrongfully imprisoned received a combined total of ninetynine years in prison. They were released several years after their convictions. Maurice Possley, Our
Clients’ Stories of Innocence, UNIV. WASH. SCH. L. INNOCENCE PROJECT NW. CLINIC,
http://www.law.washington.edu/clinics/ipnw/stories.aspx#gassman
[https://perma.cc/V7
FY-V9FV]; see also Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 630, 248 P.3d at 169.
162. People v. Jimerson, 535 N.E.2d 889 (Ill. 1989). The defendant, Verneal Jimerson, was
accused with three others, Dennis Williams, Kenneth Adams, and Willie Rainge, for a double
murder. Id. at 891. They were convicted based in part on perjured incentivized informant testimony
and later exonerated. Id. at 891, 909. See also Steve Mills, ‘Ford Heights Four’ Exonerated, but Not
Free from Pasti, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 11, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-11/news/ctford-heights-four-met-20140411_1_two-decades-ford-heights-four-northwest-indiana
[https://perma.cc/5QN6-LWWD].
163. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 444 N.E.2d 136, 137 (Ill. 1982) (involving a witness who said
that she was forced to lie about others involved in a rape and two murders); People v. Rainge, 445
N.E.2d 535, 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (same); People v. Gray, 408 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (same); Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 630, 248 P.3d at 169 (involving an informant—a
defendant in a robbery case—who falsely accused three men as being his accomplices, to protect his
friends who did commit the crime).
164. See, e.g., People v. Burrows, 665 N.E.2d 1319, 1328 (Ill. 1996) (holding that granting
defendant’s new trial was warranted after new evidence showed that primary witness in case
admitted her trial testimony was perjured and that she alone killed the victim); Warden, supra note
13, at 14 (assigning 45% of wrongful capital convictions to snitch testimony).
165. Compare Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 267 (1959) (involving prosecutor’s failure to
disclose promise not to prosecute witness), with Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 628, 248 P.3d at 168
(involving defendant-informant’s desire to allow the real accomplices to remain free in addition to
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such as criminal history—if it exists—may be required, as material, but
it may not capture important incentives that this type of informant has.166
5.

The Confidential Informant

The confidential informant is a form of witness whose testimony is
used in court by law enforcement and prosecutors but whose identity
remains hidden from the public and parties at trial.167 Allowing a witness
to testify anonymously helps protect the informant from threats and
harm, helps preserve the government’s investigation, and allows for the
witness’s continued participation in the criminal justice system.168
These confidential informants are major players in the incentivized
informant system.169 Yet these informants’ background information—
name, testimonial history, criminal history, and much more—remain
hidden to protect their identity.170 Troublingly, Andrew Chambers Jr.
was a confidential informant for most of his cases.171 Confidential
informants play an important role as bread-and-butter witnesses in some
areas of criminal law, especially drug cases.172
getting a reduced sentence by telling the government that three later-exonerated men helped him
commit the crime).
166. See Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 628, 248 P.3d at 168.
167. The U.S. Attorney General defines a confidential informant (CI), or as they put it a
“confidential human source,” as anyone “who is believed to be providing useful and credible
information to the FBI for any authorized information collection activity, and from whom the FBI
expects or intends to obtain additional useful and credible information in the future, and whose
identity, information or relationship with the FBI warrants confidential handling.” U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL ALBERTO R. GONZALES, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE
OF FBI CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCES 4 (2006) [hereinafter AG INFORMANT GUIDELINES],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-guidelines-use-of-fbi-chs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/376C-Y3MQ]; see also FLA. STAT. § 914.28 (2017) (defining confidential
informant).
168. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (“The problem is one that calls for
balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to
prepare his defense.”); see also Arthur L. Sr. Burnett, The Potential for Injustice in the Use of
Informants in the Criminal Justice System, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 1079, 1085 (2008) (“A citizen must
have the right to a hearing to endeavor to convince the decision maker that his apprehension and
detention is the result of mistaken identity or outright fabrication and falsehood by one or more
confidential informants in the intelligence gathering process.”).
169. Lord, supra note 9.
170. AG INFORMANT GUIDELINES, supra note 167, at 4.
171. Wagner, supra note 1.
172. ROBERT R. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM 64–66 (2000). Indeed, confidential informants are used heavily outside of the drug
context at the state and local level. See Law Enforcement Confidential Informant Practices: J.
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security & Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 107
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Because of the extra difficulties confidential informants pose, this
Comment does not focus in-depth on changing the government’s use of
this type of informant.173 But because information about confidential
informants must be disclosed when necessary to prepare a defendant’s
case, confidential informants remain a part of this overall discussion.174
These five general types of informants lay the foundation to
determine what information is needed to evaluate an incentivized
informant’s credibility. In turn, all actors in the criminal justice system
can use this information to assess an incentivized informant’s credibility
before and during a trial.175
But how did “snitching” develop in the American criminal justice
system? Some countries, such as Canada, as well as several European
(2007),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg36784/html/CHRG-110hhrg36784.htm
[https://perma.cc/AT9T-BL2F] (statement of Alexandra Natapoff, Professor of Law, Loyola Law
School) (“Of course, only about 10 percent of all of our criminal justice system is Federal. Ninety
percent is State. So, I agree with your proposition that data collection and guidance monitoring at
the State and local level is of paramount importance.”).
173. This Comment’s aim is to offer several solutions to the false incentivized informant
testimony problem. While confidential informants are a large part of the informant system, see, e.g.,
AUDIT OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PROGRAM, supra note 139, at i, this Comment will not try to redetermine when the government should reveal information about its confidential informants. As
Roviaro already states, there is a balancing between public interest and a defendant’s right to
prepare his or her case. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60–62. This concept can readily be applied to the plea
deal context before trial. However, requiring information about a confidential informant before a
plea deal, as opposed to trial, may require the government to devote more resources to the early
phases of cases. See also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 697–98 (2004) (“The Court there [in
Roviaro] stated that no privilege obtains ‘[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the
contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused.’ . . . Accordingly, even though the informer in Roviaro did not testify, we held that
disclosure of his identity was necessary because he could have ‘amplif[ied] or contradict[ed] the
testimony of government witnesses.’” (citations omitted)).
174. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62 (“We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure [of a
confidential informant’s identity] is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the
public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his
defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the
possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.”).
175. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002) (“And in any case, as the proposed plea
agreement at issue here specifies, the Government will provide ‘any information establishing the
factual innocence of the defendant’ regardless. That fact, along with other guilty-plea safeguards,
see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, diminishes the force of Ruiz’s concern that, in the absence of
impeachment information, innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty.” (emphasis
added)). Note the facts of the case of Ruiz and the government’s agreement: (1) the defendant was
caught with about sixty-five pounds of marijuana, and (2) the government promised to turn over any
facts establishing innocence as a part of the plea deal agreement. Id. at 622. As will be discussed
later in this Comment, there are certain situations, even under Ruiz, where informant impeachment
information should be provided to establish the requisite “sufficient awareness” under the U.S.
Constitution. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
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nations, look at this type of incentivized informant testimony with great
skepticism and disfavor.176 The next Part gives a brief history of
snitching, and provides three modern examples of where this practice
has gone awry.177
II.

AMERICA’S HISTORY OF SNITCHING: INCENTIVIZED
INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

This Part first gives a brief history of snitching and incentivized
informants in America. It then describes modern issues with incentivized
informants, using three examples: the informant scandal in Orange
County, California; the Statler cases from Washington State; and the
issues with informant use in Clark County, Nevada.
A.

The Foundation, Development, and Rise of Snitches in American
Criminal Cases

One of the earliest recordings of a “snitching” case in the United
States involved two brothers, Jesse and Stephan Boorn (the Boorn
Brothers).178 In 1819, in Manchester, Vermont the Boorn Brothers were
accused and convicted of murdering their brother-in-law, Russell
Colvin.179 One of the Boorn Brothers, Jesse, was placed in a cell next to
a known forger, Silas Merrill.180 Merrill testified at the Boorn Brothers’

176. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 64 (“Well into the 1970s, ‘[t]hroughout most of continental
Europe . . . virtually all these [undercover] techniques were viewed, even by police officials, as
unnecessary, unacceptable, and often illegal.’ Today, many European countries engage in some
form of these tactics, but to a lesser degree than does American law enforcement.” (citations
omitted)).
177. The examples are just three of many. And they represent a historical problem of informant
use in the American criminal justice system. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 154, at 50 (“Mindful of
the decades of abuses committed by Bulger and Flemmi’s FBI handlers, in early 2001 Attorney
General Janet Reno issued sweeping new guidelines governing the use of informants. Reno’s
guidelines addressed the FBI’s multiple failures in the Bulger case: agents were prohibited from
making promises of immunity to informants, a Confidential Informant Review Committee was
established to approve and monitor high-level informants, and it became a requirement that federal
prosecutors be notified when an informant was under investigation.”).
178. THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 2. This is not to exclude the prominent use of spies
during the Revolutionary War: George Washington employed intelligence networks during the
Revolutionary War. DENNIS G. FITZGERALD, INFORMANTS, COOPERATING WITNESSES AND
UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 6 (2015).
While an important source of early government intelligence gathering, these spy practices are only
tangentially related to the modern use of informants in the American criminal justice system.
179. THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 2.
180. Id.
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trial that Jesse Boorn confessed to committing the murder to him.181
Merrill was freed from jail for his testimony. 182 The Boorn Brothers
were sentenced to death.183 However, right before the Boorn Brothers
were hanged, the alleged murder victim, Colvin, reappeared, alive,
several states away in New Jersey.184 Merrill, it turned out, was a pioneer
American jailhouse snitch.
Several decades later during the American Civil War, from 1861 to
1865,185 tens of thousands of Union and Confederate prisoners created
ideal conditions for large-scale jailhouse snitching.186 Indeed, in addition
to prisoners providing information to their captors, a sizable portion of
these prisoners changed their allegiance after being imprisoned.187 And
while by no means reflecting the modern snitch system, the presence of
prisoner-informants, or “razorbacks,”188 in Civil War prisons
demonstrates the core issue with snitches: an innate desire to appeal to
authorities in power to gain more favorable treatment.189
More than half a century later, after the Prohibition era of the 1920s
and early 1930s, another surge in snitching occurred.190 The Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms switched its focus from enforcing
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Important Proclamations.; The Belligerent Rights of the Rebels at an End, N.Y. TIMES (May
10, 1865), http://www.nytimes.com/1865/05/10/news/important-proclamations-belligerent-rightsrebels-end-all-nations-warned-against.html [https://perma.cc/FYG8-429A].
186. Ovid Futch, Prison Life at Andersonville, in CIVIL WAR PRISONS 15 (William Best
Hesseltine ed. 1972) (“He will do anything to win approval of those human beings in whose power
he finds himself . . . . Considering the conditions that existed in the Andersonville [Confederate-run
prison] stockade, it is not surprising that some prisoners turned informers.”).
187. See PAUL J. SPRINGER & GLENN ROBINS, TRANSFORMING CIVIL WAR PRISONS: LINCOLN,
LIEBER, AND THE POLITICS OF CAPTIVITY 59 (2014) (“The defection rate at Camp Lawton in
Millen, Georgia was . . . 349 of a total of 9,698 prisoners [who] took the Confederate oath during
late October and early November of 1864. This number fell just short of 4 percent of the camp
population.”).
188. LONNIE R. SPEAR, PORTALS TO HELL: MILITARY PRISONS OF THE CIVIL WAR 317 (1997)
(“[R]azorback: A Judas; one who informed on fellow POWs [prisoners of war] for special
privileges or treatment; a spy in the prison population who would inform the authorities of any plans
or rumors of escapes.”).
189. Call, supra note 126, at 73–74.
190. See Oversight Hearings on Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Special Hearing:
Department of the Treasury Nondepartmental Witnesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong. 6, 200 (1979) (“The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms had its origin in enforcement of the alcohol taxation and later prohibition laws . . . . Some
of the more serious abuses relating to entrapment involve informants of questionable character who
were given incentives to entrap individuals.”).
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Prohibition to using entrapment and informants for firearms
enforcement.191 And over the next few decades, informant use would
grow from an informal part of American law enforcement practices, to
an integral part of the criminal justice system.192
This growth of informant use exploded in the 1960s and 1970s with
the expansion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s anti-crime efforts
and the “War on Drugs.”193 President Nixon’s declaration of the War on
Drugs, and President Ronald Reagan’s reemphasis of this “war” created
a then unprecedented expansion of the use of informants.194 This held
especially true for the DEA.195 Informants also became an important part
of efforts to fight organized crime, and, eventually the War on Terror.196
But backlash also followed the increased use of incentivized
informants.197 The rise of “no snitching” or anti-informant feelings
across America soared when Congress began passing a flurry of anticrime bills throughout the 1980s and 1990s.198 These bills included the
creation of mandatory minimums for drug offenders.199 These
mandatories could be reduced through “substantial assistance,” creating
large incentives for informants to testify.200
Highlighting the anti-informant sentiment in the 1980s and 1990s, a
longtime jailhouse snitch, Leslie Vernon White, admitted to reporters
that he consistently provided law enforcement and prosecutors with false

191. See id. at 6–7, 200.
192. FITZGERALD, supra note 178, at 1–2, 7–8.
193. Id. at 1–2.
194. See id. at 18; Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control (June 17, 1971), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048 [https://perma.cc/
S3BF-2TPK]; PAULA MALLEA, THE WAR ON DRUGS: A FAILED EXPERIMENT 34 (2014) (“In 1972,
President Richard Nixon first declared a War on Drugs. Legislation produced harsher penalties and
expanded the numbers of offences that could be prosecuted . . . . In 1986, under Ronald Reagan, the
United States re-dedicated itself to the War on Drugs and passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.”).
195. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC
POLICY 74 (1990).
196. FITZGERALD, supra note 178, at 1–2, 23.
197. See generally Law Enforcement Confidential Informant Practices: J. Hearing Before
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. & the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1–2 (2007).
198. BROWN, supra note 154, at 11.
199. Id.
200. Id. Those who provide “substantial assistance” get a “5k” motion from prosecutors—a term
coming from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines—which reduces the cooperator’s sentence based on
the guideline matrix. Id.
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testimony.201 He lied to get benefits from the government.202 The story
was hugely controversial and immediately caught the public’s
attention.203
Leslie Vernon White was a career criminal who provided false
testimony in dozens of cases.204 White sometimes pretended to be a
police officer during his time in prison to gather information about an
incarcerated person’s case through the telephone.205 Then White would
use this information to provide fabricated testimony about an
incarcerated person to law enforcement and prosecutors.206 Because law
enforcement and prosecutors believed that there was no other way for
White to know about this information, they believed him.207 The
information that White provided, such as the alleged location of the
crime and people involved, corroborated information that supposedly
only law enforcement and prosecutors had access to.208 White used this
information to make up false stories about incarcerated people and
prisoners awaiting trial.209 Prosecutors convicted numerous individuals
based off of this information.210
A subsequent grand jury proceeding following the fallout from
White’s admissions led Los Angeles County to find jailhouse informant
testimony inherently unreliable and place severe restrictions on the use
of this type of testimony.211
Even after the Leslie Vernon White scandal, and many other highprofile informant scandals, incentivized informants continue to be a core

201. Robert Reinhold, California Shaken over an Informer, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 1989),
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/17/us/california-shaken-over-an-informer.html
[https://perma.cc/5HNX-F97F].
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 2.
205. Rohrlich, supra note 127.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Reinhold, supra note 201 (“Defense lawyers have compiled a list of 225 people convicted of
murder and other felonies, some sentenced to death, in cases in which Mr. White and other jailhouse
informers testified over the last 10 years in Los Angeles County.”). Other jurisdictions should not
wait until a scandal of this magnitude or with this much publicity forces them to change their
practices dealing with incentivized informants.
211. See generally L.A. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 132.
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component of the American criminal justice system. 212 The next section
examines three current modern controversies involving incentivized
informant testimony: Orange County, California; the Statler cases in
Washington State; and Clark County, Nevada. These three controversies
help show the current scope of issues with incentivized informant
testimony. They also highlight the wide geographic range of these issues
across America.
B.

Contemporary Snitching in America: Three Recent Controversies
Showing How Incentivized Informants Continue to Be a Major
Contributor to Wrongful Imprisonment

This section outlines incentivized informant testimony in the modern
context. It does so first by highlighting disclosure failures by the Orange
County, California District Attorney’s Office and Sheriff’s Department.
It then reviews the battle three men endured to get released from prison
and receive compensation for being wrongfully convicted from false
informant testimony in Washington State. Lastly, this section inspects
prosecutors’ failures in Clark County, Nevada to keep their promise to
track and disclose their informants.213
1.

Welcome to the O.C.: Informant Misuse in Orange County,
California

In late 2014, a scandal involving the Orange County District
Attorney’s Office (OCDA) broke loose: members of the OCDA were
caught lying about, hiding, and misusing their informants in criminal
cases.214
212. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577, 595, 249 P.3d 669, 677 (2011) (involving
three men who were convicted based on informant testimony but later found innocent and
exonerated).
213. Incentivized informant scandals are major issues in other regions in the U.S. as well, not just
Orange County and Clark County. For example, Texas, which continues battling a huge wrongful
conviction problem, passed a new law in June of 2017 to reform the use of jailhouse snitches. H.B.
34, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017), https://legiscan.com/TX/text/HB34/id/1625182 [https://
perma.cc/Q5NY-AY6N] (requiring prosecutors to keep detailed records about the jailhouse
informants that they use, including their criminal history, benefits received for testifying, and the
nature of their testimony). This bill went into effect on September 1, 2017. Id.; see also Texas
Cracks Down on the Market for Jailhouse Snitches, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/07/15/opinion/sunday/texas-cracks-down-on-the-market-for-jailhouse-snitches.
html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/P9YR-QWTM] (“Texas, which has been a minefield of wrongful
convictions—more than 300 in the last 30 years alone—passed the most comprehensive effort yet to
rein in the dangers of transactional snitching.”).
214. Further scandals continue to plague Orange County. See Sharyn Alfonsi, Informant Says He
Was Planted in Orange County to Snitch, CBS NEWS (May 21, 2017),
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Resisting court efforts to disclose informant information, on
September 22, 2014, the OCDA dismissed attempted murder charges
against Joseph Govey.215 It was the third time in three months that the
same prosecutor, Tony Rackauckas, dropped murder charges after
defense attorneys accused Rackauckas and the OCDA of improperly
withholding jailhouse informant information.216 Earlier in June 2014, the
superior court judge hearing Govey’s case, Judge Thomas Goethals,
ordered Rackauckas to disclose a long-held list of jailhouse
informants.217 Instead, to avoid disclosing the jailhouse informant list,
Rackauckas opted to dismiss the attempted murder charges against
Govey.218
Then in early 2015, the controversy ballooned: Judge Goethals
discharged the entire OCDA from accused mass-murderer Scott
Dekraai’s case.219 In 2014, Dekraai pled guilty to eight charges of firstdegree murder and was eligible for the death penalty.220 There was little
doubt about Dekraai’s guilt, but the OCDA refused to comply with
Judge Goethals’ order to turn over jailhouse informant evidence to
Dekraai’s defense counsel.221 In response to the OCDA’s refusal, Judge
Goethals found that the OCDA violated Dekraai’s constitutional rights,
including his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.222 The
judge then removed all 250 OCDA prosecutors from Dekraai’s case.223
The Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) fueled Judge
Goethals’s decision to remove all OCDA prosecutors from Drekaai’s
case.224 The OCSD took nearly four years to turn over jailhouse
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/informant-says-he-was-planted-in-orange-county-jail-to-snitch/
[https://perma.cc/2C5J-PAZA]; Williamson, supra note 131.
215. Rex Dalton, More Murder Charges Dropped in Wake of DA Informants Case, VOICE OC
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://voiceofoc.org/2014/09/more-murder-charges-dropped-in-wake-of-da-inform
ants-case/ [https://perma.cc/9W4U-CDJR]. Govey had a criminal record at the time that the charges
were filed. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Christopher Goffard, Orange County D.A. Is Removed from Scott Dekraai Murder Trial,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/orangecounty/la-me-jailhousesnitch-20150313-story.html [https://perma.cc/SS8M-N36Z].
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Christopher Goffard, Stakes Rise in Jailhouse Informant Case as Judge Blasts O.C. Sheriff,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016, 9:35 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-oc-jailsnitch-scandal-20161216-story.html [https://perma.cc/FW8S-P7WK].
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informant information in Drakaai’s case.225 When the OCSD finally
turned over this information, it was heavily redacted.226 The OCSD also
denied having a jail informant program, a statement later contradicted by
“Special Handling” documents about jailhouse informants revealed
during discovery.227
Next, after a hearing in Drakaai’s case, Santa Ana Assistant Public
Defender Scott Sanders revealed that the OCSD maintained a secret
twenty-five-year-old computerized database on informants with
potentially exculpatory information.228 During a 2015 hearing, Judge
Goethals found that two members of the OCSD intentionally lied or
willfully withheld information in the Drakaai case.229
Judge Goethals expressed his dismay at the scandal: “[i]t apparently
stems from [Rackauckas’] loyalty to his law enforcement partners at the
expense of his other constitutional and statutory obligations.”230
One year later, Judge Goethals overturned Henry Rodriguez’s murder
conviction, another high-profile OCDA case.231 The judge found the
government’s use of jailhouse informants troubling and that it
potentially violated Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right against selfincrimination.232
As the Orange County informant scandal received national scrutiny,
in late 2016, the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) launched a civil rights
investigation of both the OCDA and the OCSD.233 The Los-Angelesbased DOJ announced the investigation at the end of 2016 after defense
attorneys made allegations that the OCDA violated several defendants’
rights by using informants to gather evidence in secret.234

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Dahlia Lithwick, You’re All Out: A Defense Attorney Uncovers a Brazen Scheme to
Manipulate Evidence, and Prosecutors and Police Finally Get Caught, SLATE (May 28, 2015, 1:38
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/orange_county_prose
cutor_misconduct_judge_goethals_takes_district_attorney.html [https://perma.cc/R6E2-QM8C].
229. Goffard, supra note 219.
230. Id.
231. Scott Moxley, OC Judge Overturns Murder Conviction Because of Prosecution Cheating,
OC WEEKLY (Feb. 25, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.ocweekly.com/news/oc-judge-overturnsmurder-conviction-because-of-prosecution-cheating-6999292 [https://perma.cc/89E5-M2LF].
232. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
233. Kelly Puente & Tony Saavedra, Feds Launch Investigation into Orange County D.A.’s
Office, Sheriff’s Department over Jailhouse Informants, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Dec. 16, 2016,
1:11 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/-738533.html [https://perma.cc/MR7S-UN7M].
234. Id.
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The DOJ’s investigation is ongoing in 2018 as of this Comment’s
writing and remains in its preliminary stages.235 Regardless of the DOJ’s
results, the incentivized informant scandal in Orange County, California
demonstrates the greater need for guidelines, laws, and rules that control
how the government uses these informants.
2.

Snitch Deal: A Fight for Freedom and Just Compensation in the
Statler Cases

Paul Statler,236 Robert Larson, and Tyler Gassman were convicted of
first-degree robbery, two counts of first-degree assault, and two counts
of drive-by shooting in February of 2009.237 Their convictions came
from a drug-related event in 2008 in Spokane Valley, Washington.238
The Statler cases239 began in 2008 when five men, including Anthony
Kongchunki and Matthew Dunham, robbed two males in an OxyContin
drug transaction.240 One or more of the robbers fired shots as they fled
the scene.241 Later that same month, Kongchunki and Dunham were
arrested for a different robbery.242 After investigating the 2008 robbery,
law enforcement learned that the shotgun used in that robbery was

235. Id. However, in the interim, the State Bar of California recently recommended suspending a
prosecutor at the OCDA for at least one year. See Matt Ferner, State Bar Recommends Suspension
of Orange County Prosecutor for Withholding Evidence, HUFFPOST (Oct. 12, 2017, 5:53 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/state-bar-recommends-suspension-of-orange-county-prosecu
tor-for-withholding-evidence_us_59dfadace4b04d1d518046ed [https://perma.cc/3S9T-X773]. The
State Bar of California found that this prosecutor willfully withheld material exculpatory evidence
from a defendant during a criminal child abuse case. Id. And at a 2013 hearing to address the
prosecutor’s failure to turn over Brady evidence, the prosecutor indicated that she would withhold
the information again. See id.; Sandra Lee Nassar, A Member of the State Bar, No. 199305, 14-O00027-YDR (State Bar of Cal. Oct. 10, 2017), http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/14-O00027.pdf [https://perma.cc/56R2-WRU9] (finding by clear and convincing evidence that OCDA
prosecutor suppressed evidence which violated Brady and recommending bar suspension).
236. Maurice Possley, Paul E. Statler, NAT’L REGISTRATION EXONERATIONS (July 26, 2013),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4233 [https://perma.
cc/GRN7-W9N2] [hereinafter Statler, NRE].
237. Larson v. State, 194 Wash. App. 722, 729, 375 P.3d 1096, 1101 (2016), review denied, 186
Wash. 2d 1025, 385 P.3d 117 (2016).
238. See Statler, NRE, supra note 236.
239. Even though this incident involved three men, Statler, Larson, and Gassman, who were
wrongfully convicted in three separate but related cases, common local usage refers to their three
criminal cases as the “Statler cases.” So, this Comment follows that usage.
240. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 726–27, 375 P.3d at 1098–99.
241. Id. at 727, 375 P.3d at 1099.
242. Id.
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located at Paul Statler’s home.243 Law enforcement searched Statler’s
home and found the shotgun there.244
Meanwhile, Kongchunki and Dunham sat in the Spokane County jail
for one month, where, given ample time to craft a consistent story
together, they told police that Statler, Larson, and Gassman were
involved in the robberies.245 But when the government declined to offer
Kongchunki a non-prison sentence, he recanted his story and said that
none of the three other men—Paul Statler, Robert Larson, and Tyler
Gassman—participated in the robberies.246 Detective Marske, the
investigating officer, responded ominously to Kongchunki’s recantation:
lying at trial is perjury.247 So, only Dunham248 testified against Statler,
Larson, and Gassman.249 Dunham received a reduced sentence of
seventeen months of confinement in a juvenile detention facility.250 In
exchange, the three men received a combined ninety-nine year
sentence.251 Statler was sentenced to forty-one years in prison, Gassman
thirty-eight years, and Larson twenty years.252
In 2012, three years after Statler, Larson, and Gassman were
convicted, Spokane County Superior Court Judge Michael J. Price
dismissed their 2009 convictions for robbery, assault, and drive-by

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id. at 727–28, 375 P.3d at 1099–1100.
Id. at 728, 375 P.3d at 1100.
Id.; see also Kip Hill, Wrongful Imprisonment Claims Fail Before Spokane Judge,
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 17, 2015, 4:23 PM), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2015/feb/17/
imprisoned-men-lose-lawsuit-against-state/ [https://perma.cc/QYB5-YPRG] (describing how the
initial lawsuit involving Statler, Larson, and Gassman for their wrongful imprisonment claims
failed).
247. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 728, 375 P.3d at 1100.
248. It is worth noting that Dunham implicated Statler, Larson, and Gassman in four different
cases, and it was only in one of these cases that a court found the trio guilty. See State v. Statler, 160
Wash. App. 622, 630, 248 P.3d 165, 169 (2011); State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577, 595, 249
P.3d 669, 677 (2011); State v. Gassman, 160 Wash. App. 600, 607, 248 P.3d 155, 158 (2011).
249. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 728, 375 P.3d at 1100.
250. Id. at 728–29, 375 P.3d at 1100–01.
251. Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 630, 248 P.3d at 169; Possley, supra note 161.
252. Statler, 160 Wash. App. at 630, 248 P.3d at 169; Larson, 160 Wash. App. at 595, 249 P.3d
at 677; Gassman, 160 Wash. App. at 607, 248 P.3d at 158; see also State v. Gassman, 175 Wash. 2d
208, 210, 283 P.3d 1113, 1114 (2012) (holding that Washington Appeals Court abused its discretion
when imposing sanctions on the state for careless actions in prosecuting Gassman’s case because
there was no showing that the state intentionally acted in bad faith while prosecuting Gassman);
Possley, supra note 161.
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shooting.253 Judge Price dismissed the case, citing doubts about the
witness Dunham based on post-conviction evidence.254 The government
originally promised to re-try Statler, Larson, and Gassman, but finally
dismissed their charges in 2013.255
The trio later filed for compensation for wrongful conviction in 2014
under Washington State’s Wrongly Convicted Persons Act.256 In 2014,
the Washington State Court of Appeals denied their request for
compensation.257 However, the Washington State Court of Appeals
reversed the denial in 2016 and remanded the case for the trial court to
decide whether the trio was “actually innocent” by clear and convincing
evidence.258 In April 2017 all three men were awarded under
Washington’s wrongful compensation statute.259 They were found
“actually innocent” of the crimes that they served over three years in
prison for.260
The Statler cases are an example of the accomplice and calumniator
informants defined earlier in this Comment. Dunham, the incentivized
informant in the Statler cases, testified not only to get a reduced
sentence, but also to protect three of his accomplices.261 The other
accomplice’s (Kongchunki) recantation was excluded from the initial

253. Thomas Clouse, Judge Throws Out Robbery Convictions: Three Men Freed After Four
Years in Custody, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Dec. 15, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.spokesman.com/
stories/2012/dec/15/judge-throws-out-robbery-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/969V-YTPE].
254. Id.
255. See Triple Exoneration: Charges Dismissed Against Three Men Wrongly Imprisoned on
Testimony of Informant, UNIV. WASH. SCH. L. (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.law.uw.edu/news/
2013/ipnwtripleexoneration/ [https://perma.cc/C5ZQ-M246].
256. Larson v. State, 194 Wash. App. 722, 375 P.3d 1096 (2016), review denied, 186 Wash. 2d
1025, 385 P.3d 117 (2016); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060(1)(c)(ii) (2016) (allowing
compensation for wrongful imprisonment after showing by clear and convincing that the claimant
did not commit the crime or crimes).
257. See Larson, 194 Wash. App. 722, 375 P.3d 1096.
258. Id. at 725, 375 P.3d at 1098.
259. Spokane County Superior Court Enters Order Awarding Compensation for Wrongful
Convictions, TERRELL MARSHALL L. GROUP PLLC (Apr. 13, 2017), http://terrellmarshall.com/
spokane-court-awards-compensation-wrongful-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/RY9H-GQ8W] (“This
was the first case ever tried under Washington’s wrongful conviction compensation statute, chapter
4.100 RCW.”); see also Nina Culver, Spokane County’s Insurer Offers $2.25 Million Settlement to
Three Men Wrongfully Convicted of Robbery, SPOKESMAN-REV. (June 7, 2017, 10:20 PM),
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/jun/07/spokane-countys-insurer-offers-225-millionsettlem/ [https://perma.cc/PQE3-6AE6] (describing how Statler, Larson, and Gassman received a
settlement for their wrongful imprisonment after suing under Washington’s wrongful conviction
compensation statute).
260. Culver, supra note 259.
261. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 728–29, 375 P.3d at 1100–01.
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case, but later used to discredit Dunham’s testimony at the postsentencing phase.262
3.

Clark County Prosecutors Break Their Promise to Track and
Record Their Use of Informants263

In 2008, facing a law mandating that prosecutors in Nevada maintain
a database on their use of informants, the Clark County District
Attorney’s Office (CCDAO) promised to maintain this database in lieu
of legislation.264 That year, on June 9, a Nevada-based criminal defense
association, the Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice (NACJ),265
approached the Nevada Legislature’s Advisory Committee on the
Administration of Justice.266 A representative of the NACJ, Assistant
Federal Public Defender Lori Teicher, discussed a proposal for reducing
false informant testimony.267 Teicher suggested that the Nevada State
Legislature pass a bill requiring prosecutors to maintain a database of
their informants and promises that prosecutors knew were made to these
informants.268
Clark County District Attorney Christopher J. Lalli responded: there
were informal mechanisms in place for tracking witness-informants and
Lalli’s organization was creating a formal policy for tracking the

262. See generally Larson, 194 Wash. App. 722, 375 P.3d 1096.
263. Dameon Pesanti, Inside Information: Cops Use Confidential Informants to Go Where They
Can’t, CHRON. (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.chronline.com/crime/inside-information-cops-useconfidential-informants-to-go-where-they/article_09cdf67e-7a02-11e5-9758-5f374b9ca0a0.html
[https://perma.cc/FVD3-EALG]; Ken Ritter, ‘Surreal’ Feeling for Nevada Man Freed After 23
Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 30, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-surreal-feeling-forlas-vegas-man-freed-after-23-years-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/6EHQ-ZA74].
264. Bethany Barnes, DA Criminal Informant Safeguard Rarely Used in Clark County, Records
Suggest, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Mar. 13, 2016, 9:57 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/lasvegas/da-criminal-informant-safeguard-rarely-used-clark-county-records-suggest [https://perma.cc/
6TQT-657D].
265. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., MINUTES OF THE
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 15 (2008), https://www.leg.state.
nv.us/Session/74th2007/Interim_Agendas_Minutes_Exhibits/Minutes/AdminJustice/IM-Admin
Justice-060908-10118.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN5Z-87HP] [hereinafter NEVADA LEG. JUNE 9, 2008
MINUTES] (statement of Lori Teicher). The NACJ is affiliated with the National Association of
Criminal of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NADCL).
266. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., MINUTES OF THE 20152016 INTERIM ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 14 (2016),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/6844 [https://perma.cc/NYF8H5F7] [hereinafter NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES].
267. NEVADA LEG. JUNE 9, 2008 MINUTES, supra note 265, at 15 (statement of Lori Tiecher).
268. Id.
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issue.269 Then, during another meeting with the Committee on the
Administration of Justice on July 7, 2008, Lalli said that legislation was
not necessary to mandate maintaining internal informant databases.270
Lalli mentioned an informant database, including an inducement index
that the neighboring Churchill County District Attorney’s Office
implemented.271 He said that the CCDAO would also create and
maintain a database of informants and the promises made to them.272
Yet five years later in 2013, the database had a mere 130 entries, an
alarmingly low figure given that the CCDAO prosecuted over 33,000
criminal cases between 2008 and 2013.273 In response, the Committee on
the Administration of Justice met again on June 14, 2016 to address the
informant issue.274 At this meeting, the Commission concluded that “[i]t
does not seem that voluntary adoptions of these [informant database]
polices and implementation is really happening effectively.”275 After
eight years of the CCDAO’s failure to implement an informant database
system, the Commission once again started considering statutory
requirements.276
Also at the June 14, 2016 meeting, the Rocky Mountain Innocence
Center Innocence Project presented an “Innocence Protections Proposal”
to the Nevada State Advisory Commission on the Administration of
Justice.277 The Rocky Mountain Innocence Center’s presentation
reemphasized the need for an informant database.278 It also suggested
269. Id. at 16 (statement of Christopher J. Lalli).
270. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., MINUTES OF THE
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 17 (2008), https://www.leg.state.nv.
us/74th/Interim_Agendas_Minutes_Exhibits/Minutes/AdminJustice/IM-AdminJustice-07070810118.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PPP-VLCD] [hereinafter NEVADA LEG. JULY 7, 2008 MINUTES]
(statement of Christopher J. Lalli).
271. Id. at 17–19. “Inducement index” means a record of the promises made to informants in
exchange for their testimony. Id.
272. Id.
273. Barnes, supra note 264; see also The Law Offices of Jeffrey Jaeger, Use of Confidential
Informants in Clark County Remains Murky Issue, FACEBOOK (June 14, 2016),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/the-law-offices-of-jeffrey-jaeger-chtd/use-of-confidential-inform
ants-in-clark-county-remains-murky-issue/1736429003299757/
[https://perma.cc/58ZY-FLC5]
(lamenting the CCDAO’s failure to track informants in a database).
274. See NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at 1.
275. Id. at 14.
276. Id.
277. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INNOCENCE CTR. INNOCENCE PROJECT, INNOCENCE PROTECTIONS
PROPOSAL PRESENTED TO THE NEVADA STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 1 (2016), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/4361 [https://
perma.cc/7HNE-SJFF].
278. Id. at 5.
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statutes mandating: (1) pretrial disclosure of the prosecution’s intent to
use an informant, and (2) requiring corroboration for all informant
testimony.279 And, most importantly, the Rocky Mountain Innocence
Center noted that the CCDAO failed to adequately maintain an
informant database, suggesting that a voluntary adoption policy was not
effective.280
Then, on November 1, 2016, the Commission on the Administration
of Justice met again to discuss the informant database issue.281 They had
several agenda proposals for the issue, including requiring every Nevada
State prosecutor’s office, not just Clark County’s, to track informant use
through databases.282 And in February of 2017, the Commission issued a
Final Report discussing draft legislation recommendations for informant
databases in Nevada.283 These recommendations included establishing a
legislative study on the use of “criminal justice information sharing”
systems and “encouraging all criminal justice stakeholders” to work
together to create “a statewide criminal justice information sharing
database.”284
Finally, the Nevada Senate Committee on Judiciary passed Senate
Bill 277 to fund a study about integrating criminal justice information
systems for informant use.285 The bill created a subcommittee that will
review criminal justice information systems and determine how to
integrate such a system statewide.286 As of January 2018, this
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., MEETING NOTICE AND
AGENDA 1 (2016), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/9455
[https://perma.cc/3XFQ-CBJ6].
282. Id. at 18–19. There were some other recommendations, including pre-trial reliability
hearings by the judge, as well as jury instructions warning about an informant’s reliability. Id. at 19.
283. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NEV. STATE LEG., FINAL REPORT 2–3
(2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/9887 [https://perma.cc/
3XFQ-CBJ6].
284. Id.; see also CLARK COUNTY, SCOPE OVERVIEW, https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/Interim
Committee/REL/Document/9095 [https://perma.cc/5TLG-DMGA] (encouraging Clark County
officials to create and maintain an informant database).
285. See S.B. 277, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/
REL/79th2017/Bill/5238/Overview [https://perma.cc/P3VY-GW78].
286. Id. § 1.3. This subcommittee is called the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Information
Sharing of the Commission. Id.; see also Jeff Schied, Democrats Advance Criminal Justice Agenda,
in Tempered Form, NEV. INDEP. (June 18, 2017, 2:10 AM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/art
icle/democrats-advance-criminal-justice-agenda-in-tempered-form [https://perma.cc/A4ED-3W27]
(“The subcommittee will be authorized to appoint working groups and make recommendations for
changes in criminal justice information policies. The bill, sponsored by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, passed unanimously out of both houses. It was approved by the governor on May 24.”).
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subcommittee has not met.287 But its eventual meeting and review of
criminal information sharing will shape the future for how informants
are handled in Nevada. It may also serve as a model for all U.S. states.
America has used incentivized informants in criminal proceedings
from its founding years until today.288 Since then, as the criminal justice
system grew, informant use exploded.289 The three ongoing issues in
Orange County, California, Washington State, and Clark County,
Nevada show that incentivized informants remain a major concern for
wrongful imprisonment. These issues also show that American states are
struggling to address false informant testimony. 290 To solve this
problem, a variety of approaches are needed.
III. HOW TO REDUCE FALSE IMPRISONMENT CAUSED BY
INCENTIVIZED INFORMANTS: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
An informant’s purpose is to help the government convict a guilty
criminal, not an innocent person. 291 This Part suggests several solutions
to help reduce wrongful imprisonment from false incentivized informant
testimony.292
There are a variety of ways to reduce the problems with incentivized
informant testimony.293 This Comment offers solutions that can be used
alone or combined with one another. It first suggests how to identify and
define “incentivized informant.” Next, it suggests ways that state and
local governments can improve informant use. These solutions include
statutes, court rules, and other rules and guidelines to guide local

287. See Advisory Committee on Nevada Criminal Justice Information Sharing, NEV. STATE
LEG., https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Interim2015/Committee/268/Over
view [https://perma.cc/PJK3-GQY5].
288. THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 2.
289. FITZGERALD, supra note 178, at 1–2, 7–8.
290. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 264 (reporting that the CCDAO was rarely updating their
informant database despite their promises to do so).
291. “A prosecutor who does not appreciate the perils of using rewarded criminals as witnesses
risks compromising the truth-seeking mission of our criminal justice system.” United States v.
Bemal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). For a great discussion about
prosecutors’ use of incentivized informants, see Trott, supra note 12, at 1432.
292. While much of this Comment’s focus is on prosecutors, law enforcement also plays a huge
role in the incentivized informant system. See STATE’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY
MATERIAL EXTENDED BEYOND INDIVIDUAL PROSECUTOR ASSIGNED TO CASE, 20 NO. 10 CRIM.
PRAC. REP. 3 (2006) (“Unknown to the prosecuting attorney, for the past 10 years the snitch had
been a police informant for the local police department and even had his own confidential informant
number.” (citing Maryland v. Williams, 896 A.2d 973 (Md. 2006))).
293. See generally NATAPOFF, supra note 50.
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governments on their use of incentivized informants. And finally, this
Comment identifies a pre-plea deal legal standard for informant
disclosure under Ruiz in light of a circuit split among the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.
A.

Identifying and Defining Incentivized Informants: How
Legislatures, Courts, and Other Governmental Actors Should
Frame the Informant Issue

The first step to reduce false incentivized informant testimony is to
define “incentivized informant.” The second step is to decide what
information affects these informants’ credibility and should be collected
and turned over to the accused and to the court. Legislatures, courts, and
government actors in turn can use this information to propose various
solutions to the incentivized informant issue.
1.

“Incentivized Informant” Is a Witness Who Testifies in Exchange
for a Benefit

The definition of “incentivized informant” determines the scope and
effect that a solution, such as a statute or court rule, has on reforming
informant use.294 An incentivized informant is a witness who has an
incentive to testify on behalf of the government.295 The term has two
parts: “incentivized” and “informant.”
a.

Government Actors Should Define “Incentive” as Certain Benefits
Offered to Witnesses

An incentive is a reason or motivation for doing something.296 In the
informant context, this could be to escape criminal liability, obtain a
reduced sentence, receive money, prevent friends or accomplices from
being incarcerated, as well as myriad other reasons to testify for the
government.297 How “incentive” or similar terms like “benefit” or

294. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (2017) (“For the purposes of this Section,
‘informant’ means someone who is purporting to testify about admissions made to him or her by the
accused while incarcerated in a penal institution contemporaneously.”).
295. See E.S.S.B. 5038, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
296. See, e.g., id. (“‘Benefit’ means any deal, payment, promise, leniency, inducement, or other
advantage offered by the state to an informant in exchange for his or her testimony, information, or
statement”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (“any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the
offering party has made or will make in the future to the informant”).
297. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 28.
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“inducement” are defined dictates what information the government
must collect and disclose to the accused and the court.298
Academics and state legislatures have defined “incentive” several
different ways.299 For example, a bill proposed in the Washington State
Legislature in the 2017 legislative session, Engrossed Substitute Senate
Bill (ESSB) 5038, defined “benefit”—analogous to “incentive”—as the
following:
“Benefit” means any deal, payment, promise, leniency,
inducement, or other advantage offered by the state to an
informant in exchange for his or her testimony, information, or
statement, but excludes a court-issued protection order.
“Benefit” also excludes assistance that is ordinarily provided to
both a prosecution and defense witness to facilitate his or her
presence in court including, but not limited to, lodging, meals,
travel expenses, or parking fees.300
ESSB 5038 limited the definition of incentives to those benefits
promised by or expected from the government. Yet this definition does
not capture other incentives that a witness might have to lie, such as
escaping criminal liability or preventing a friend or family member from
being incarcerated.301 The government cannot know every benefit that an
informant expects. But the government can—and should—know about
promises that it makes to an informant.302

298. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (requiring the government to disclose a jailhouse
informant’s testimonial history, promises made by the offering party, any recantations by the
informant, and other information bearing on the informant’s credibility); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127a
(West 2017) (“For purposes of subdivision (c), ‘consideration’ means any plea bargain, bail
consideration, reduction or modification of sentence, or any other leniency, benefit, immunity,
financial assistance, reward, or amelioration of current or future conditions of incarceration in return
for, or in connection with, the informant’s testimony in the criminal proceeding in which the
prosecutor intends to call him or her as a witness.”).
299. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 28 (listing various informant incentives, including
drugs, money, clothing, and other gifts); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(c)(2) (“[P]rosecution shall
timely disclose . . . any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or
will make in the future to the informant.”); E.S.S.B. 5038.
300. E.S.S.B. 5038.
301. See, e.g., State v. Statler, 160 Wash. App. 622, 630, 248 P.3d 165, 169 (2011) (finding three
later-exonerated men guilty based on informant testimony); State v. Larson, 160 Wash. App. 577,
595, 249 P.3d 669, 677 (2011) (same); State v. Gassman, 160 Wash. App. 600, 607, 248 P.3d 155,
158 (2011) (same); cf. State v. Gassman, 175 Wash. 2d 208, 210, 283 P.3d 1113, 1114 (2012)
(reversing sanctions against the government that it received because of constantly changing the
defendants’ alleged crime date). All three of these cases resulted in the wrongful conviction of three
men because the testifying incentivized informant wanted his other three accomplices to remain
free.
302. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985).
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This definition excludes from “benefit” something that is an ordinary
transaction cost borne by the government.303 These costs include per
diem, housing, and transportation.304 These were excluded from the
definition of “benefit” in ESSB 5038 because they are so small that they
are unlikely to act as an incentive for a witness to testify. This definition
also helps reduce concerns about confidential informants, mentioned in
Part I, by excluding some disclosures under a court-issued protection
order.305
It is more difficult for the government to know a witness’s subjective
view of what a benefit is.306 Despite this uncertainty, the government can
often discover or anticipate what benefits a witness might expect and
why.307 For example, if the government has the discretion to
significantly reduce a witness’s sentence, but has not promised to do so,
then this should still warrant disclosure to the defense.308
b.

“Informant” Should Be Defined as a Witness Who Testifies for the
Government in Exchange for a Benefit

The second term, “informant,” is someone who testifies on behalf of
the government in exchange for or in expectation of a benefit.309 The
informant is a government witness who has a stake in testifying at
trial.310 For example, Washington State’s E.S.S.B. 5038 offers the
following definition of “informant”:

303. E.S.S.B. 5038.
304. Id.
305. Id.; see also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
306. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (2017) (limiting the government’s disclosure obligation
to promises or offers that the government made to the informant, as well as other information that
the government discovers through the course of its investigation).
307. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (CALJIC) 3.20 (2016) (“In evaluating this
testimony, you should consider the extent to which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or
expectation of, any benefits from the party calling that witness.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11521(c) (requiring the government to disclose any deal, promise, or inducement “that the offering
party has made or will make in the future to the informant” (emphasis added)). The Illinois State
government requires the prosecution anticipate future promises and disclose this to the defense.
308. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW 7 (2007),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/death_penalty_re
form/jailhouse20snitch20testimony20policy20briefpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4Q5-PYST] (giving
a list of jurisdictions whose jury instructions tell the jury to consider a witness’s expected benefits
for testifying, including Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Wisconsin).
309. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, supra note 307; E.S.S.B. 5038.
310. See E.S.S.B. 5038 § 1(2)(a).
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(2)(a) “Informant” means the following individuals who provide
information or testimony in exchange for, or in expectation of, a
benefit: (i) Any criminal suspect, whether or not he or she is
detained or incarcerated; and (ii) Any incarcerated individual.
(b) An informant does not include an expert witness or a victim
of the crime being prosecuted.311
An incentivized informant has something to gain from testifying.312 It
is legally acceptable for the government to use these types of
witnesses.313 But all material impeachment evidence about these
witnesses must be turned over to the defense in anticipation of trial.314
So, the next step is to determine what information materially affects an
informant’s credibility.
c.

Determining the Criteria Material to an Informant’s Credibility as
a Witness

Material exculpatory impeachment evidence for a government
witness must be turned over to the defense.315 Whether evidence is
material depends on if there is a “reasonable probability” that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the proceeding’s outcome would
have been different.316
The information that bears on an informant’s credibility as a witness
according to U.S. Supreme Court case law includes (1) prior inconsistent
statements or false statements made by a witness or informant;317 (2) any
material exculpatory evidence favorable to the defendant that is known
by others acting on the government’s behalf;318 (3) the prosecutor’s
311. E.S.S.B. 5038; see also Robert M. Bloom, Jailhouse Informants, 18 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 1,
(2003), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_magazine_home/crimjust_spring
2003_jailhouse.html [https://perma.cc/A38V-3Y3G] (criticizing the unreliability and history of
using incentivized informants).
312. See, e.g., H.B. 34, 85th Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (“An attorney representing the state shall
track . . . any benefits offered or provided to a person in exchange for testimony described by
Subdivision (1).”).
313. See generally Larson v. State, 194 Wash. App. 722, 725, 375 P.3d 1096, 1098 (2016),
review denied, 186 Wash. 2d 1025, 385 P.3d 117 (2016); NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 28.
314. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
315. Id.
316. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440–41 (1995). One of the issues with materiality is that it
can be difficult to assess and enforce. Whether something could reasonably affect the trial’s
outcome can usually be determined only when the trial is over or nearing completion. Moreover,
even if something is material, a losing defendant would have to know about missing material
evidence and press for its disclosure on appeal.
317. See id. at 453–54; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153.
318. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
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knowing use of perjured testimony;319 (4) charges the witness or
informant is facing—if the charges are associated with a deal or bargain
with the government;320 (5) benefits the prosecution promises to the
witness or informant;321 and (6) prior criminal convictions.322
Those seeking to expand the scope of “material” information under
Brady can do so using statutes, court rules, or other guidelines.323 The
following example is some of the material information required by a bill
proposed in the Washington State Legislature in the 2017 legislative
session:
(a) The complete criminal history of the informant, including
any pending criminal charges or investigations in which the
informant is a suspect; (b) Any benefit the state has provided or
may provide in the future to the informant in the present case,
including any written agreement related to a benefit, and
information related to the informant’s breach of any conditions
contained within the agreement; (c) The substance, time, and
place of any statement allegedly given by the defendant to the
informant, and the substance, time, and place of any statement
given by the informant to law enforcement implicating the
defendant in the crime charged, including the names of all
persons present when any statement was allegedly given by the
defendant to the informant . . . [and] (i) Any other material or
information in the possession, custody, or control of the state
that bears on the credibility or reliability of the informant or the
informant’s statement.324
These definitions—what “informant,” “incentive,” and “material”
mean—lay the foundation for legislatures, courts, and other government
actors to propose solutions for the incentivized informant issue. Going
319. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
320. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Some jurisdictions go as far as to require
prosecutors to disclose all current charges against an informant, even if no deal or agreement is
formally discussed. See, e.g., Ruetter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578, 581 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
government’s failure to disclose to the defense that the government’s key witness had applied for
sentence commutation was a Brady violation which required reversing the defendant’s conviction).
321. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 684.
322. See id. at 113–14 (holding that prosecutor’s failure to disclose victim-witness’s criminal
record, though relevant under Brady, nonetheless did not require disclosure because it was not
material to the case); see also WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(a)(vi) (2016) (“[T]he prosecuting
attorney shall disclose to the defendant . . . any record of prior criminal convictions known to the
prosecuting attorney.”).
323. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (2017) (requiring the government to turn over “any
other information relevant to the informant’s credibility”).
324. E.S.S.B. 5038, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
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beyond current case law, these actors have a variety of options to reduce
wrongful imprisonment caused by incentivized informant testimony:
statutes, court rules, informant databases, and jury instructions.
B.

State Statutes Can Protect and Bolster Brady’s Constitutional
Guarantees by Regulating Incentivized Informants

State statutes are an effective way to regulate incentivized informant
testimony.325 As described earlier, these statutes can define “incentivized
informant” and describe what information the government must collect
and disclose.326 These statutes can directly tell the government, including
law enforcement and prosecutors, what information to collect and
disclose.327 Or, a statute may give discretion to the court or prosecutors
on how to regulate informants.328
One example of a statute giving discretion to courts is pretrial
reliability hearings.329 A pretrial reliability hearing gives the presiding
judge the ability to screen a potential witness and exclude this witness if
the judge thinks that this witness is not credible.330 This hearing is
similar to in camera review and reliability hearings for experts.331 Just
like expert witnesses, the judge would determine whether the informant
is credible enough and has sufficient knowledge to testify.332
Illinois currently uses pretrial reliability hearings to vet incentivized
informants:
The court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the
testimony of the informant is reliable, unless the defendant
waives such a hearing. If the prosecution fails to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the informant’s testimony is
reliable, the court shall not allow the testimony to be heard at
trial. At this hearing, the court shall consider the factors

325. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.5 (West 2017); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21; H.B. 34, 85th
Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); E.S.S.B. 5038.
326. See. e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21.
327. See id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. (“If the prosecution fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the informant’s
testimony is reliable, the court shall not allow the testimony to be heard at trial.”).
331. FED. R. EVID. 702; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
332. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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enumerated in subsection (c) as well as any other factors relating
to reliability.333
While the pretrial reliability hearing can do some good, its ultimate
effectiveness depends on what the judge decides is or is not reliable.334
In addition, it takes from the trier of fact the ability to assess a witness’s
credibility.335 Unlike expert testimony, a person’s credibility is not based
on technical information.336 One could argue that the judge is so familiar
with the criminal justice system that she is better suited to assess
credibility than jurors. But this could also dangerously blur the line
between the judge as the “gatekeeper” and the jury as the trier of fact.337
Another option that some statutes use is to require independent
corroboration for informant testimony: there must be independent
evidence verifying the truth of the informant’s testimony, such as the
defendant’s DNA at the scene of the crime.338 Indeed, the California
Penal Code requires independent corroboration.339 Yet even
corroboration may not be enough in some situations.340 In the Statler
cases, discussed earlier in this Comment, police found a shotgun in Paul
Statler’s home.341 The police noted that this shotgun matched a witness’s
description of the shotgun used in the robbery.342 Then the prosecuting
attorney’s office used this independently corroborated information with
false incentivized informant testimony at trial.343 Three men—Statler,
Gassman, and Larson—were convicted based on this information.344

333. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21.
334. See JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW, supra note 308, at 7.
335. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, ACLU, THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT:
PROPOSALS, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/informant_proposedlegislation.
pdf [https://perma.cc/HTA8-VES4].
336. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–92.
337. See generally id.
338. “A jury or judge may not convict a defendant, find a special circumstance true, or use a fact
in aggravation based on the uncorroborated testimony of an in-custody informant.” CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1111.5 (West 2017).
339. Id.
340. See, e.g., Larson v. State, 194 Wash. App. 722, 726–27, 375 P.3d 1096, 1098–99 (2016),
review denied, 186 Wash. 2d 1025, 385 P.3d 117 (2016) (reversing trial court’s imposition of a
heightened burden for claimants like Statler, Larson, and Gassman to get compensation under
Washington’s wrongful conviction statute).
341. Larson, 194 Wash. App. at 726–27, 375 P.3d at 1098–99.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 729, 375 P.3d at 1101.
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They were later found innocent after officials discovered that the
informant, Dunham, lied about the trio’s involvement.345
An additional option is to use court rules to encourage government
disclosure of informants.346 These too can be pushed by state
legislatures, or courts can take the initiative and pass these rules.
Examples include the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 3.8,
Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, and states’ equivalent ethical
rules.347 However, even court rules have limitations: government actors
are rarely punished for violating Rule 3.8.348
Statutes can be used as one method to regulate incentivized
informants in the criminal justice system. However, pushback in some
state legislatures by law enforcement, prosecutors, and other organized
groups may be a major obstacle to passing these types of statutes.349
C.

Informant Databases Force Prosecutors and Law Enforcement to
Account for Their Informants

As noted earlier in this Comment, the issue with incentivized
informants is not solely with prosecutors. Law enforcement also plays a
major role in the use of this type of testimony. 350 Sometimes prosecutors
lack information about an informant that law enforcement possesses.351

345. See Clouse, supra note 253.
346. See WASH. SUPER. CT. R. 4.7 (a)(vi) (2016).
347. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); see also Wayne D.
Garris, Jr., Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8: The ABA Takes a Stand Against Wrongful
Convictions, 22 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 829, 836 (2009) (describing the potential for new provisions
in the ethical rules to encourage prosecutors to take a more active role in preventing wrongful
convictions).
348. See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the
Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV.
283, 300–01 (2001).
349. See, e.g., E.S.S.B. 5038, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (failing to pass informant
reform bill in the state House after strong opposition by organized law enforcement and prosecutor
interest groups—the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs (WASPC) and the
Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (WAPA)).
350. See STATE’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY MATERIAL EXTENDED BEYOND
INDIVIDUAL PROSECUTOR ASSIGNED TO CASE, 20 NO. 10 CRIM. PRAC. REP. 3 (“Unknown to the
prosecuting attorney, for the past 10 years the snitch had been a police informant for the local police
department and even had his own confidential informant number.” (citing Maryland v. Williams,
896 A.2d 973 (Md. 2006)).
351. See generally Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006).
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And what prosecutors do not know, they cannot disclose to the
defense.352
Databases tracking informant information, including their names,
promises the government offered them, and other information affecting
informants’ credibility is another solution.353 This is a solution that can
be self-enforcing, meaning law enforcement and prosecutors collect this
information as a matter of internal policy.354 But experience suggests
that consistent compliance to collect and maintain an informant database
may be better done through statute.355
Federal law does not mandate that prosecutors and law enforcement
share databases cataloging informants.356 However, databases are a
practical way to make sure prosecutors have all the information that they
need to turn over to the defense.357 Furthermore, this information should
be available to the court or the defense when noncompliance is
suspected. Databases are also a way for prosecutors to satisfy their
constitutional “duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the
police.”358
Even though databases can be used to expose the information and
history of an informant, a proper compliance mechanism is required.359
For state legislatures considering enacting a database law for informants,
the Clark County, Nevada case is instructive: legislators created a
subcommittee to investigate informant databases due to a lack of entries

352. Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 273 (“[T]he answer to
Brady violations might be finding a way to relieve police and prosecutors of the responsibility for
identifying ‘exculpatory’ evidence rather than punishing them for perceived misconduct.”).
353. NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at 1.
354. NEVADA LEG. JULY 7, 2008 MINUTES, supra note 270, at 70 (statement of Christopher J.
Lalli).
355. See NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at 1.
356. See Associated Press, Authorities Fear Dangers of Online ‘Rat’ Database, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 30, 2006, 10:05 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15978145/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/
authorities-fear-dangers-online-rat-database/#.WjS_3d-nHyQ [https://perma.cc/5PT5-3ASK].
357. See Williamson, supra note 131 (“The database tracking inmates’ movements around the jail
and the reason for those movements is significant, because Orange County law enforcement and
prosecutors were in the habit of placing targeted suspects in proximity to criminal informants.”).
358. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
359. See, e.g., NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at 1 (discussing the need
for legislative action after a county prosecuting attorney’s office failed to maintain an informant
database).
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in a self-enforced CCDAO—a prosecutor’s office—informant
database.360
Whether the CCDAO’s lack of action came from willful disobedience
or mere neglect,361 a law requiring prosecutors to catalog informants in a
database may encourage greater compliance with informant databases.
Informant databases should be a joint responsibility for law
enforcement and prosecutors. In this way, prosecutors are not solely
liable for failures to provide information about government
informants.362 This system is also more robust because law enforcement
is usually the first government actor to deal with informants.363 If law
enforcement and prosecutors are forced to work together in maintaining
an informant database, then neither can blame the other for failing to
provide this information. Both would be legally required to comply. The
onus would not just fall on prosecutors to gather and maintain an
informant database.
D.

Jury Instructions: Alerting Jurors About Non-Credible Witnesses Is
an Incremental Step to Regulate the Effect of False Incentivized
Informant Testimony

Several jurisdictions have enacted jury instruction requirements that
warn juries of the incentives that witnesses may have to testify and lie.364
The purpose is to ensure that jurors adequately account for potentially
dubious testimony from incentivized informants.365 But empirical
360. Barnes, supra note 264; see also NEVADA LEG. 2016 INTERIM MINUTES, supra note 266, at
1.
361. Records strongly indicate that the CCPAO was neglectful and did not make the time to enter
informants into the database. An email from the Chief Deputy District Attorney to the CCPAO
stated in part: “[s]eems like it’s time for a little reminder about the inducement index . . . I received
a stream of emails to make entries into the index after my last reminder. But, the stream has dried
up. So, either no inducements are being given or else people are forgetting about the index.” Barnes,
supra note 264.
362. Though it is, ultimately, the prosecutors who face a motion for a new trial if law
enforcement fails to turn over material information about an informant. Youngblood v. West
Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006).
363. See NATAPOFF supra note 50, at 84–85 (noting that police are subject to few documentation
requirements, and their decisions to make an arrest or investigate a crime are not usually subject to
judicial challenge or review).
364. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, supra note 307 (“The testimony of
an in-custody informant should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny. In evaluating this
testimony, you should consider the extent to which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or
expectation of, any benefits from the party calling that witness.”).
365. See, e.g., Instructing About Informer’s Testimony, 2 FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK: CRIMINAL
§ 75:22 (4th ed.) (“While the testimony of an informer is competent evidence, it should be
accompanied by instructions designed to call the attention of the jury to the character of the
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evidence indicates that these jury instructions may not have a significant
impact in preventing wrongful convictions.366
Several states have jury instructions specifically for informant
testimony.367 One example of this type of jury instruction comes from
North Carolina:
You may find from the evidence that a State’s witness is
interested in the outcome of this case because of the witness’
activities as an [informer] [undercover agent]. If so, you should
examine such testimony with care and caution in light of that
interest. If, after doing so, you believe the testimony in whole or
in part, you should treat what you believe the same as any other
believable evidence.368
Another example of jury instructions addressing informant testimony
comes from Alaska:
An informant is someone who provides evidence against
someone else for money or to escape or reduce punishment for
[his] [her] own misdeeds or crimes. The testimony of an
informant must be examined and weighed by the jury with
greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. The jury
must determine whether the informant’s testimony has been
affected by the agreement [he] [she] has with the prosecution or
[his] [her] own interest in the outcome of this case or by
prejudice against the defendant.369
Even if jury instructions do not often affect a jury’s decision in
incentivized informant cases, these instructions are a step in the right

informer, leaving to the jury the question of the value and credibility of his testimony. . . However,
where the informer’s testimony has been adequately corroborated, no specific instruction relating
directly to the testimony of informer is required.” (citations omitted)).
366. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 178; see also Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of
Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury Decision Making, 32 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 137 (2008) (describing two small-scale experiments showing that jurors’ verdict decisions
did not change appreciably when they were told that a witness was getting a benefit to testify).
367. See ALASKA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 1.23 (2017); CALIFORNIA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, supra note 307.
368. NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIM 104.30 (2015); see also United
States v. Luck, 611 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel when the
defendant’s counsel failed to request an informant jury instruction); Bryan Gates, Failure to Request
a Jury Instruction on Informants, N.C. CRIM. L.: UNC SCH. GOV’T BLOG (July 13, 2010),
http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/failure-to-request-a-jury-instruction-on-informants/
[https://perma.cc/V83F-7WXC] (suggesting that a defense counsel’s failure to request an informant
jury instruction after United States v. Luck is automatically ineffective assistance of counsel).
369. ALASKA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIMINAL), supra note 367.
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direction.370 Instead of taking the government’s witness at face value as
a credible actor, the jury is asked to consider whether the witness has
any incentives to lie. As such, a jury instruction, even if negligible in
application, is better than nothing. But a more effective step in the right
direction in preventing wrongful imprisonment from incentivized
informants would involve disclosing informant information during plea
deals.371
IV. AFTER RUIZ: REQUIRING INCENTIVIZED INFORMANT
DISCLOSURE BEFORE PLEA DEALS WHEN THE
GOVERNMENT’S CASE RELIES ON MATERIAL
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ACTUAL
INNOCENCE
While this Comment proposes solutions to prevent wrongful
imprisonment caused by false incentivized informant testimony for a
defendant facing trial, plea deals comprise the bulk of how criminal
cases end.372 Indeed, out of 83,941 federal cases in 2010, 96.8% of these
cases ended in plea deals instead of a trial.373 And at the state level, in
2006, 94% of the 592,420 sample state felony cases ended in guilty
pleas.374 Yet in United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court found that the
Constitution generally does not require pre-guilty plea disclosure of
impeachment information partly because it is difficult to tell when this
information is useful to the accused.375
This Part first dissects Ruiz’s analysis. It compares Ruiz to different
U.S. Courts of Appeals’ interpretations.376 It also describes how Ruiz,
370. NATAPOFF, supra note 50, at 178.
371. Id. at 81.
372. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING:
RESEARCH SUMMARY (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary
.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY56-T3NC] (“[S]cholars estimate that about 90 to 95 percent of both federal
and state court cases are resolved through this process [of plea deals].”).
373. 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 50.
374. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS, 2006 – STATISTICAL TABLES 25 tbl.4.1 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK4P-PXPK]. The total sample size of state court guilty pleas
was 592,420. Id. at 43. The average guilty plea prison sentence was 1.4 months compared to 8.9
months for trial cases. Id. at 44. The large discrepancy between plea sentences and trial sentences
may be attributed to higher penalties—or less to lose—under certain circumstances, which cause a
defendant to take their case to trial.
375. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
376. See, e.g., Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014) (“We do not decide whether
appellants have a constitutional right to receive exculpatory Brady material from law enforcement
prior to entering into a plea agreement.”).
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U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and other case law support a standard
which sometimes requires the government to turn over exculpatory
informant information before a plea deal. Finally, this Part offers a legal
standard consistent with Ruiz’s reasoning that courts can follow to
require the government to turn over this information. This is especially
important, because some U.S. Courts of Appeals are split on how to
interpret Ruiz in the plea deal context.377
A.

Ruiz’s Reasoning and Other Supreme Court Precedent Support a
Standard to Require Disclosing Material Exculpatory Evidence
Before Plea Deals

Ruiz leaves open the possibility that, if exculpatory evidence is
material to the accused’s defense, or a lack of information about a
dubious informant prevents a valid constitutional waiver for a valid plea
deal, then the government must turn over exculpatory information about
an informant.378 Both arguments come from Ruiz’s narrow case-specific
analysis and U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
As a part of the Ruiz Court’s reasoning, it considered the ability of a
court to determine whether information about an informant is useful to
the accused.379 However, if the government’s case stands or falls based
on an informant’s testimony—material exculpatory evidence supporting
factual innocence—a court can readily determine that this information
would be useful to the accused.380 That is, false informant testimony that
is the primary basis for the government’s case is not a “degree of help”
that will “depend upon the defendant’s own independent knowledge of
the prosecution’s potential case.”381 Unlike impeachment evidence,
disclosing exculpatory evidence would make a potentially innocent
suspect feel less pressure to agree to a plea deal. In contrast, a guilty
suspect would not get this information and would feel more pressure to

377. See United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting a split between
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ interpretation of Ruiz).
378. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.
379. Id. at 639. For a brief discussion countering Justice Thomas’s valid concern in his
concurrence about improperly relying on a “usefulness standard,” see supra note 250.
380. See, e.g., McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Thus, we have a
question not directly addressed by Ruiz: whether a criminal defendant’s guilty plea can ever be
‘voluntary’ when the government possesses evidence that would exonerate the defendant of any
criminal wrongdoing but fails to disclose such evidence during plea negotiations or before the entry
of the plea.”).
381. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630.
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accept a plea deal.382 As the Seventh Circuit properly notes, government
knowledge about an informant may sometimes rise to the level of
material exculpatory evidence implicating due process and the validity
of constitutional waivers.383
The Ruiz Court also stated that a valid constitutional waiver of a plea
deal must be knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and made with sufficient
awareness, but that it does not require complete knowledge of the
information.384 The Court acknowledged that sometimes the accused
must know some of this information, but that the defendant Ruiz did not
need to know these facts in her case given that immigration agents had
already found thirty kilograms of marijuana in her luggage.385 There was
little support in Ruiz’s case that she needed to know the impeachment
information to make a voluntary waiver.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama386
reiterated a long-held principle: a guilty plea cannot be truly voluntary
unless the defendant understands the law in relation to the facts.387
Unlike Ruiz’s case, where additional facts about impeachment evidence
would not help her understanding of her case when she was caught with
over sixty-five pounds of marijuana, other cases would differ.388
When an informant’s testimony provides the primary evidence
pointing toward guilt, and the government knows of its falsity, then the
accused may not understand the true facts of the case without knowing
key information about the informant.389 In these cases, defendants cannot
382. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/
G9R4-2W2C] (“Against this background, the information-deprived defense lawyer, typically within
a few days after the arrest, meets with the overconfident prosecutor, who makes clear that, unless
the case can be promptly resolved by a plea bargain, he intends to charge the defendant with the
most severe offenses he can prove.”).
383. See Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782.
384. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630.
385. Id. at 625.
386. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
387. Id. at 243 n.5 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938)).
388. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.
389. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 466 (“[A] prisoner in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a
state court of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into
the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention.”). This Comment notes the very real
danger that some guilty criminals will learn that the state’s evidence is weak or the evidence is
something not tying them to their crime, refuse a plea deal, risk trial, and in some cases, get away
without punishment. This risk is real. However, given the duty of the government to protect a
person’s life, liberty, and the fact that nearly 50% of wrongful capital conviction cases are
attributable to dubious snitch testimony, the risk is well worth it. See THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); Warden, supra note 13.
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validly waive their constitutional rights and accept a plea deal. This is
because defendants are not aware of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences of going to trial, as opposed to accepting a guilty
plea.
The Ruiz Court uses the analogy of a defendant waiving her right to
remain silent: she can waive this right even though she does not know
the specific questions that she will be asked.390 But this waiver is
different than a plea deal waiver. A waiver of the right to remain silent is
premised on answering a set of any questions. But a plea deal waiver is
premised on the accused’s belief that the government has a legitimate,
non-fabricated, case.391
Moreover, targeting situations where the government’s case is mostly
based on an informant’s testimony, and the government has material
exculpatory evidence supporting actual innocence, would not overly
burden the government in its use of informants. That is because this only
applies to a subset of cases where the government primarily relies on
informant testimony for its case and the government knows it is false.
Yet even if requiring the government to turn over this type of
information before a plea deal involves a lot of cases, this is more cause
for concern: many more people are at risk of pleading guilty to crimes
that they did not commit.392
Ruiz and other U.S. Supreme Court precedent leave open—and
strongly suggest—a constitutional requirement that the government turn
over material exculpatory evidence supporting factual innocence to the
accused before plea deals.393
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit was correct in applying a distinction
between exculpatory and impeachment evidence.394 Material evidence
supporting factual innocence bears on whether the guilty plea is
voluntary because a defendant must understand the basic facts of their
case.395 Mere impeachment evidence goes to credibility, which does not
affect voluntariness of a guilty plea.396 That is, impeachment evidence
390. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 632.
391. See McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
392. See Rakoff, supra note 382.
393. Compare United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting
distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence under Ruiz in the context of plea deals),
with Mangialardi, 337 F.3d at 787–88 (stating that when the government knowingly and primarily
relies on non-credible informant testimony, then Ruiz strongly suggests disclosure before a guilty
plea).
394. See generally Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782.
395. See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
396. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623.
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does not go to the facts of the case, but the weight of the government’s
case. In contrast, material exculpatory evidence—the government’s
knowledge that the accused is innocent because the informant lied—
goes to the core facts of the case.397 This is much like the video evidence
in Alvarez v. City of Brownsville.398 In Alvarez, there was material
exculpatory evidence showing that the defendant was actually innocent:
the video showed that the defendant did not assault the detention officer
and that this detention officer was lying.399
Similarly, the Second Circuit supports a pre-plea requirement for
exculpatory information.400 Prior to Ruiz, the Second Circuit found that
the government’s obligation to disclose Brady materials is relevant to the
accused’s decision to plead guilty.401 Specifically, a defendant is entitled
to full awareness of evidence favorable to the accused and known by the
government.402 This included material exculpatory information about
informants.403
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that Ruiz did not address
whether the government is required to disclose exculpatory, rather than
impeachment, evidence before a plea deal.404 The Fourth Circuit also
noted this split in 2010.405
397. See Mangialardi, 337 F.3d at 788.
398. 860 F.3d 799 (5th Cir. 2017).
399. Id. at 800.
400. See United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 804–05 (2d. Cir. 1999).
401. Id. at 804.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 804–05. Even though Perisco was decided before Ruiz, it was based on both material
impeachment and exculpatory evidence. Post Ruiz, lower district courts in the Second Circuit
continue to require pre-plea disclosures for material exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
Danzi, 726 F. Supp. 2d 120, 128 (D. Conn. 2010) (“[T]he Second Circuit has not yet had an
opportunity to consider whether Ruiz’s reasoning—that impeachment material need not be disclosed
to a criminal defendant pre-plea—also encompasses exculpatory material . . . [t]he Court declines
the Government’s invitation to hold that Ruiz applies to exculpatory as well as impeachment
material”). But see Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
consistently treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the same way for the purpose of
defining the obligation of a prosecutor to provide Brady material prior to trial . . . and the reasoning
underlying Ruiz could support a similar ruling for a prosecutor’s obligations prior to a guilty plea.”
(internal citations omitted)).
404. United States v. Webb, 651 Fed. App’x 740, 744 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting the circuit split on
the pre-plea issue, but not deciding it because the government did not possess the information
before the plea). These pre-plea issues raise another important question: is the government required
to fix the issue once it gets exculpatory information after a guilty plea and sentencing? The answer,
at least according to the American Bar Association, is yes. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
405. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Price v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice Att’y Office, 865 F.3d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“a ‘prosecutor is permitted to consider
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Given that U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the U.S. Constitution
suggest some form of pre-plea disclosure, the final task is to articulate a
legal standard that conforms with the Ruiz Court’s analysis.
B.

The Plea Deal Standard Completing Ruiz: When the Government
Must Turn over Material Exculpatory Evidence to the Accused
Before a Plea Deal

The Ruiz Court’s major concerns about pre-plea disclosures were
whether a court could tell if the evidence in question was material, and
about interfering with the government’s use of informants.406 For the
first concern, if the government’s case primarily relies on an informant’s
testimony, where the government knows of the accused’s factual
innocence, then this evidence should automatically be disclosed to the
defense.407 Indeed, Justice Thomas in his concurrence noted the Ruiz
majority’s reliance on the ‘usefulness to the accused’ standard: “[t]he
Court, however, suggests that the constitutional analysis turns in some
part on the ‘degree of help’ such information would provide to the
defendant at the plea stage.”408 Similarly, for the second concern, the
government only has to disclose information about informants in limited
situations where the government has evidence of the accused’s factual
innocence.409

only legitimate criminal justice concerns in striking [a plea] bargain’” and “[t]his set of legitimate
interests places boundaries on the rights that can be bargained away in plea negotiations” (citations
omitted)); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 401 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
406. See generally United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
407. Disclosure is compelled not under Brady, but to comply with the U.S. Constitution.
408. Id. at 633. Justice Thomas opposed the majority’s constitutional analysis of providing
information before plea deals based on the usefulness of certain types of information to the
defendant or the accused. He thought this was wrong because Brady—the majority’s focal case in
Ruiz—strictly focused on avoiding an unfair trial to the accused. Id. at 633–34. He makes a good
point. However, even if the majority improperly relied on Brady for its “usefulness to the defendant
or accused” analysis, their conclusion that sometimes this information may have to be provided
before plea deals is still proper when relying on two separate, more sound standards this Comment
previously raised: (1) a guilty plea cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant understands the
law in relation to the facts, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (citing Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938) (emphasis added)); and (2) there must be an adequate record for
the court to review to ensure that the accused fully understands the plea and its consequences.
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44 (“When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate
for any review that may be later sought . . . and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that
seek to probe murky memories.” (citations omitted)).
409. The government may also request a court-issued protection order. See, e.g., E.S.S.B. 5038,
65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (allowing the government to apply for a court-issued protection
order to protect a witness’s identity).
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Thus, consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s position, this Comment
proposes the following standard for when the government must turn over
material exculpatory evidence about an informant:
When the government’s case primarily relies on informant
testimony that it knows is false and shows actual innocence,
then the government must disclose this information before a
guilty plea. The government’s knowledge of the accused’s
factual innocence, without the accused’s knowledge, means that
the accused cannot be sufficiently aware of the facts needed to
make a voluntary waiver of the accused’s constitutional
rights.410
Government power’s coercive nature and an accused’s inability to be
sufficiently aware that the government is relying on false informant
testimony requires better disclosure. When the government’s case
mostly depends on informant testimony, evidence of factual innocence
should be given to the accused before a plea deal.411 Especially because
it is very rare that the accused will accept a plea deal, later discover that
most of the government’s case was based on unreliable informant
testimony, and successfully appeal their sentence, without spending a
long time in jail or prison.412

410. See McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003); Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5
(1969) (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 466). This standard may also be applied to the non-informant
context.
411. See Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2016); Mangialardi, 337 F.3d at 787 (“The
Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz strongly suggests that a Brady-type disclosure might be required
under the circumstances of this particular case.”); Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Prosecutorial
Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 149 (2001);
Rakoff, supra note 382; Matthew Clarke, Dramatic Increase in Percentage of Criminal Cases Being
Plea Bargained, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
news/2013/jan/15/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-criminal-cases-being-plea-bargained/ [https://
perma.cc/SR77-K8W7]; Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judgesafter-rulings-on-plea-deals.html [https://perma.cc/JK9Q-4RUN]; Christine Dempsey, State Victim
Advocate: Too Many Plea Deals, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 19, 2010), http://articles.courant.com/
2010-11-19/news/hc-victim-advocate-request-1120-20101119_1_plea-bargains-michelle-cruz-trials
[https://perma.cc/EFP6-DJRX]; The Plea, Introduction, FRONTLINE PBS (Jun. 17, 2004),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/etc/synopsis.html [https://perma.cc/38GJ-LA
MN] (“[The judge] told me point blank—he said, “I will give your son 25 to life, so you better take
the plea, or if you don’t take the plea, he’s getting it.” (internal quotations omitted)); The Plea,
Interview with Defense Attorney Stephan Bright, FRONTLINE PBS (Jan. 29, 2004),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/interviews/bright.html [https://perma.cc/T8M
Y-TM8V] (“One reason that a lot of people plead guilty is because they’re told they can go home
that day because they’ll get probation. What they usually don’t take into account is that they’re
being set up to fail.”).
412. Goode, supra note 411.
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CONCLUSION
Reducing wrongful imprisonment caused by false informant
testimony requires two steps: (1) determining the type of information
that affects these informants’ credibility and how it should be collected,
and (2) turning over this information to the accused and the court so that
all actors can accurately assess these informants’ credibility.
By redefining what “material” evidence is, legislatures, courts, and
government actors can extend Brady’s scope to make the government
more rigorously assess their use of incentivized informants.
Furthermore, enhanced rules for collecting and disclosing information
about informants increases the chances of finding not only pertinent
credibility information but also material Brady evidence that may not
have been otherwise discovered. These rules should apply to plea deals
for both impeachment evidence and material exculpatory evidence.
Lastly, Ruiz’s holding leaves open the opportunity to require the
government to turn over material exculpatory evidence about informants
that show the accused’s actual innocence.413 Because plea deals cover at
least 95% of all criminal cases, both state and federal, this change would
make a huge difference.414 At the very least, recent informant scandals—
and disputes among the U.S. Courts of Appeals—warrant another look at
Ruiz and how it is interpreted.415 In light of this, the U.S. Supreme Court
ought to reexamine and clarify its position in Ruiz. A desire for
efficiency and a loyalty to precedent should not override a person’s core
constitutional right of due process of law.416

413. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
414. PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING, supra note 372; 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 50; FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, supra note 374.
415. Barnes, supra note 264; see also Dalton, supra note 215; United States v. Moussaoui, 591
F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (“To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of
whether the Brady right to exculpatory information, in contrast to impeachment information, might
be extended to the guilty plea context.”).
416. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351
(2009) (“The doctrine of stare decisis does not require us to approve routine constitutional
violations.”).

